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CONESTOGA WOOD SPECIALTIES CORPORATION; Norman Hahn; Norman Lemar
Hahn; Anthony H. Hahn; Elizabeth Hahn; Kevin Hahn, Appellants
v.
SECRETARY OF the UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES; Secretary United States Department of Labor; Secretary United States
Department of the Treasury; United States Department of Health and Human Services;
United States Department of Labor; United States Department of the Treasury.
United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit
Decided on July 26, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
COWEN, Circuit Judge
Appellants Conestoga Wood Specialties
Corporation (“Conestoga”), Norman Hahn,
Elizabeth Hahn, Norman Lemar Hahn,
Anthony Hahn,
and
Kevin
Hahn
(collectively, “the Hahns”) appeal from an
order of the District Court denying their
motion for a preliminary injunction. In their
Complaint,
Appellants
allege
that
regulations promulgated by the Department
of Health and Human Services (“HHS”),
which require group health plans and health
insurance issuers to provide coverage for
contraceptives, violate the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, (“RFRA”) and the
Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment of the United States
Constitution. The District Court denied a
preliminary injunction, concluding that
Appellants were unlikely to succeed on the
merits of their claims. Appellants then filed
an expedited motion for a stay pending
appeal with this Court, which was denied.
Now, we consider the fully briefed appeal
from the District Court's denial of a
preliminary injunction.

Before we can even reach the merits of the
First Amendment and RFRA claims, we
must consider a threshold issue: whether a
for-profit, secular corporation is able to
engage in religious exercise under the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and
the RFRA. As we conclude that for-profit,
secular corporations cannot engage in
religious exercise, we will affirm the order
of the District Court.
I.
In 2010, Congress passed the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”). The ACA requires employers with
fifty or more employees to provide their
employees with a minimum level of health
insurance. The ACA requires non-exempt
group plans to provide coverage without
cost-sharing for preventative care and
screening for women in accordance with
guidelines created by the Health Resources
and Services Administration (“HRSA”), a
subagency of HHS.
The HRSA delegated the creation of
guidelines on this issue to the Institute of
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Medicine (“IOM”). The IOM recommended
that the HRSA adopt guidelines that require
non-exempt group plans to cover “[a]ll Food
and
Drug
Administration
approved
contraceptive
methods,
sterilization
procedures, and patient education and
counseling for women with reproductive
capacity.” These recommended guidelines
were approved by the HRSA… Appellants
refer to this requirement as the “Mandate,”
and we use this term throughout this
opinion. Employers who fail to comply with
the Mandate face a penalty of $100 per day
per offending employee. The Department of
Labor and plan participants may also bring a
suit against an employer that fails to comply
with the Mandate.
II.
The Hahns own 100 percent of the voting
shares of Conestoga. Conestoga is a
Pennsylvania for-profit corporation that
manufactures wood cabinets and has 950
employees. The Hahns practice the
Mennonite religion. According to their
Amended Complaint, the Mennonite Church
“teaches that taking of life which includes
anything that terminates a fertilized embryo
is intrinsic evil and a sin against God to
which they are held accountable.”
Specifically, the Hahns object to two drugs
that must be provided by group health plans
under the Mandate that “may cause the
demise of an already conceived but not yet
attached human embryo.” These are
“emergency contraception” drugs such as
Plan B (the “morning after pill”) and ella
(the “week after pill”)… Conestoga has been
subject to the Mandate as of January 1,
2013, when its group health plan came up

for renewal. As a panel of this Court
previously denied an injunction pending
appeal, Conestoga is currently subject to the
Mandate, and in fact, Appellants' counsel
represented during oral argument that
Conestoga is currently complying with the
Mandate.
III.
We review a district court's denial of a
preliminary injunction for abuse of
discretion, but review the underlying factual
findings for clear error and questions of law
de novo…
“A party seeking a preliminary injunction
must show: (1) a likelihood of success on
the merits; (2) that it will suffer irreparable
harm if [] denied; (3) that granting
preliminary relief will not result in even
greater harm to the nonmoving party; and
(4) that the public interest favors such
relief.”… We will first consider whether
Appellants are likely to succeed on the
merits of their claim, beginning with the
claims asserted by Conestoga, a for-profit,
secular corporation.
IV.
A.
First, we turn to Conestoga's claims under
the First Amendment… The threshold
question for this Court is whether
Conestoga, a for-profit, secular corporation,
can exercise religion. In essence, Appellants
offer two theories under which we could
conclude that Conestoga can exercise
religion: (a) directly, under the Supreme
Court's recent decision in Citizens United,
and (b) indirectly, under the “passed
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through” method that has been articulated by
the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
We will discuss each theory in turn.
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court held
that “the Government may not suppress
political speech on the basis of the speaker's
corporate identity,” and it accordingly struck
down statutory restrictions on corporate
independent expenditure. Citizens United
recognizes the application of the First
Amendment to corporations generally
without distinguishing between the Free
Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause,
both which are contained within the First
Amendment. Accordingly, whether Citizens
United is applicable to the Free Exercise
Clause is a question of first impression.
…In analyzing whether constitutional
guarantees apply to corporations, the
Supreme Court has held that certain
guarantees are held by corporations and that
certain guarantees are “purely personal”
because “the ‘historic function’ of the
particular guarantee has been limited to the
protection of individuals.” The Bellotti
Court observed:
Corporate identity has been determinative
in several decisions denying corporations
certain constitutional rights, such as the
privilege against compulsory selfincrimination, or equality with individuals
in the enjoyment of a right to privacy, but
this is not because the States are free to
define the rights of their creatures without
constitutional
limit.
Otherwise,
corporations could be denied the
protection of all constitutional guarantees,
including due process and the equal
protection of the laws…Whether or not a
particular guarantee is “purely personal”

or is unavailable to corporations for some
other reason depends on the nature,
history, and purpose of the particular
constitutional provision.
Thus, we must consider whether the Free
Exercise Clause has historically protected
corporations, or whether the “guarantee is
‘purely personal’ or is unavailable to
corporations” based on the “nature, history,
and
purpose
of
[this]
particular
constitutional provision.”
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court
pointed out that it has “recognized that First
Amendment
protection
extends
to
corporations.”… The Citizens United Court
particularly relied on Bellotti, which struck
down a state-law prohibition on corporate
independent
expenditures
related to
referenda issues…
Discussing Bellotti's rationale, Citizens
United stated that the case “rested on the
principle that the Government lacks the
power to ban corporations from speaking.”
…
We must consider the history of the Free
Exercise Clause and determine whether
there is a [] history of courts providing free
exercise protection to corporations. We
conclude that there is not. In fact, we are not
aware of any case preceding the
commencement of litigation about the
Mandate, in which a for-profit, secular
corporation was itself found to have free
exercise rights. Such a total absence of
caselaw takes on even greater significance
when compared to the extensive list of
Supreme Court cases addressing the free
speech rights of corporations…
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We are unable to determine that the “nature,
history, and purpose” of the Free Exercise
Clause supports the conclusion that forprofit, secular corporations are protected
under
this
particular
constitutional
provision. Even if we were to disregard the
lack of historical recognition of the right, we
simply cannot understand how a for-profit,
secular
corporation—apart
from
its
owners—can exercise religion…
In urging us to hold that for-profit, secular
corporations
can
exercise
religion,
Appellants, as well as the dissent, cite to
cases in which courts have ruled in favor of
free exercise claims advanced by religious
organizations. None of the cases relied on by
the dissent involve secular, for-profit
corporations. We will not draw the
conclusion that, just because courts have
recognized the free exercise rights of
churches and other religious entities, it
necessarily follows that for-profit, secular
corporations can exercise religion…
Appellants also argue that Citizens United is
applicable to the Free Exercise Clause
because “the authors of the First
Amendment only separated the Free
Exercise Clause and the Free Speech Clause
by a semi-colon, thus showing the
continuation of intent between the two.” We
are not persuaded that the use of a semicolon means that each clause of the First
Amendment must be interpreted jointly.
In fact, historically, each clause has been
interpreted separately...
Second, Appellants argue that Conestoga
can exercise religion under a “passed

through” theory, which was first developed
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit in EEOC v. Townley Engineering &
Manufacturing Company, and affirmed in
Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky. In Townley and
Stormans, the Ninth Circuit held that forprofit corporations can assert the free
exercise claims of their owners.
In Townley, the plaintiff was a closely-held
manufacturing company whose owners
made a “covenant with God requir[ing] them
to share the Gospel with all of their
employees.”
Townley,
the
plaintiff
corporation, sought an exemption, on free
exercise grounds, from a provision of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act that required it to
accommodate employees asserting religious
objections to attending the company's
mandatory devotional services. Although the
plaintiff urged the “court to hold that it is
entitled to invoke the Free Exercise Clause
on its own behalf,” the Ninth Circuit deemed
it “unnecessary to address the abstract issue
whether a for profit corporation has rights
under the Free Exercise Clause independent
of those of its shareholders and officers.”
Rather, the court concluded that, “Townley
is merely the instrument through and by
which Mr. and Mrs. Townley express their
religious beliefs.” As “Townley presents no
rights of its own different from or greater
than its owners' rights,” the Ninth Circuit
held that “the rights at issue are those of
Jake and Helen Townley.” The court then
examined the rights at issue as those of the
corporation's owners, ultimately concluding
that Title VII's requirement of religious
accommodation did not violate the
Townleys' free exercise rights.
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The Ninth Circuit subsequently applied
Townley's reasoning in Stormans. There, a
pharmacy brought a Free Exercise Clause
challenge to a state regulation requiring it to
dispense
Plan
B,
an
emergency
contraceptive drug. In analyzing whether the
pharmacy had standing to assert the free
exercise rights of its owners, the court
emphasized that the pharmacy was a
“fourth-generation, family-owned business
whose shareholders and directors are made
up entirely of members of the Stormans
family.” As in Townley, it “decline[d] to
decide whether a for-profit corporation can
assert its own rights under the Free Exercise
Clause and instead examine[d] the rights at
issue as those of the corporate owners.”…
Appellants argue that Conestoga is
permitted to assert the free exercise claims
of the Hahns, its owners, under the
Townley/Stormans “passed through” theory.
After carefully considering the Ninth
Circuit's reasoning, we are not persuaded.
We decline to adopt the Townley/Stormans
theory, as we believe that it rests on
erroneous assumptions regarding the very
nature of the corporate form. In fact, the
Ninth Circuit did not mention certain basic
legal principles governing the status of a
corporation and its relationship with the
individuals who create and own the entity. It
is
a
fundamental
principle
that
“incorporation's basic purpose is to create a
distinct legal entity, with legal rights,
obligations, powers, and privileges different
from those of the natural individuals who
created” the corporation. The “passed
through” doctrine fails to acknowledge that,
by incorporating their business, the Hahns
themselves created a distinct legal entity that

has
legally
distinct
rights
and
responsibilities from the Hahns, as the
owners of the corporation… Thus, under
Pennsylvania law—where Conestoga is
incorporated—“[e]ven when a corporation is
owned by one person or family, the
corporate form shields the individual
members of the corporation from personal
liability.”
Since Conestoga is distinct from the Hahns,
the Mandate does not actually require the
Hahns to do anything. All responsibility for
complying with the Mandate falls on
Conestoga… [I]t is Conestoga that must
provide the funds to comply with the
Mandate—not the Hahns. We recognize
that, as the sole shareholders of Conestoga,
ultimately the corporation's profits will flow
to the Hahns… “The fact that one person
owns all of the stock does not make him and
the corporation one and the same person, nor
does he thereby become the owner of all the
property of the corporation.” The Hahn
family chose to incorporate and conduct
business through Conestoga, thereby
obtaining both the advantages and
disadvantages of the corporate form. We
simply cannot ignore the distinction between
Conestoga and the Hahns. We hold—
contrary to Townley and Stormans—that the
free exercise claims of a company's owners
cannot “pass through” to the corporation.
B.
Next, we consider Conestoga's RFRA claim.
Under the RFRA, “[g]overnment shall not
substantially burden a person's exercise of
religion even if the burden results from a
rule of general applicability [unless the
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burden] (1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.” As with
the inquiry under the Free Exercise Clause,
our preliminary inquiry is whether a forprofit, secular corporation can assert a claim
under the RFRA. Under the plain language
of the statute, the RFRA only applies to a
“person's exercise of religion.”
Our conclusion that a for-profit, secular
corporation cannot assert a claim under the
Free Exercise Clause necessitates the
conclusion that a for-profit, secular
corporation cannot engage in the exercise of
religion. Since Conestoga cannot exercise
religion, it cannot assert a RFRA claim. We
thus need not decide whether such a
corporation is a “person” under the RFRA.
V.
Finally, we consider whether the Hahns, as
the owners of Conestoga, have viable Free
Exercise Clause and RFRA claims on their
own. For the same reasons that we
concluded that the Hahns' claims cannot
“pass through” Conestoga, we hold that the
Hahns do not have viable claims…
Thus, we conclude that the Hahns are not
likely to succeed on their free exercise and
RFRA claims.

that granting preliminary relief will not
result in even greater harm to the
Government, and that the public interest
favors the relief of a preliminary injunction.
Therefore, we will affirm the District Court's
order denying Appellants' motion for a
preliminary injunction.
We recognize the fundamental importance
of the free exercise of religion. As Congress
stated, in passing the RFRA and restoring
the compelling interest test to laws that
substantially burden religion, “the framers of
the Constitution, recognizing free exercise
of religion as an unalienable right, secured
its protection in the First Amendment to the
Constitution.” Thus, our decision here is in
no way intended to marginalize the Hahns'
commitment to the Mennonite faith. We
accept that the Hahns sincerely believe that
the termination of a fertilized embryo
constitutes an “intrinsic evil and a sin
against God to which they are held
accountable,” and that it would be a sin to
pay for or contribute to the use of
contraceptives which may have such a
result. We simply conclude that the law has
long recognized the distinction between the
owners of a corporation and the corporation
itself. A holding to the contrary—that a forprofit corporation can engage in religious
exercise—would eviscerate the fundamental
principle that a corporation is a legally
distinct entity from its owners.

VI.
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
As Appellants have failed to show that they
are likely to succeed on the merits of their
Free Exercise Clause and RFRA claims, we
need not decide whether Appellants have
shown that they will suffer irreparable harm,

Having previously dissented from the denial
of a stay pending appeal in this case, I now
have a second opportunity to consider the
government's violation of the religious

35

freedoms of Conestoga Wood Specialties
Corporation (“Conestoga”) and its owners,
the Hahns, a family of devout Mennonite
Christians who believe in the sanctity of
human life… My colleagues, at the
government's urging, are willing to say that
the Hahns' choice to operate their business
as a corporation carries with it the
consequence that their rights of conscience
are forfeit.
That deeply disappointing ruling rests on a
cramped and confused understanding of the
religious rights preserved by Congressional
action and the Constitution… I do not
believe my colleagues or the District Court
judge whose opinion we are reviewing are
ill-motivated in the least, but the outcome of
their shared reasoning is genuinely tragic,
and one need not have looked past the first
row of the gallery during the oral argument
of this appeal, where the Hahns were seated
and listening intently, to see the real human
suffering occasioned by the government's
determination to either make the Hahns bury
their religious scruples or watch while their
business gets buried. So, as I did the last
time this case was before us, I respectfully
dissent.
I. Background
Five members of the Hahn family—
Norman, Elizabeth, Norman Lemar,
Anthony, and Kevin—own 100 percent of
Conestoga, which Norman founded nearly
fifty years… The Hahns are hands-on
owners. They manage their business and try
to turn a profit, with the help of Conestoga's
950 full-time employees… They feel bound,
as the District Court observed, “to operate

Conestoga in accordance with their religious
beliefs and moral principles.” One
manifestation of that commitment is the
“Statement on the Sanctity of Human
Life.”…
Accordingly, the Hahns believe that
facilitating the use of contraceptives,
especially ones that destroy a fertilized
ovum, is a violation of their core religious
beliefs. Conestoga, at the Hahns' direction,
had previously provided health insurance
that omitted coverage for contraception.
Then came the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (the “ACA”) and
related regulations… Under rules []
corporations like Conestoga must purchase
employee health insurance plans that include
coverage for “[a]ll Food and Drug
Administration [ (“FDA”) ] approved
contraceptive
methods,
sterilization
procedures, and patient education and
counseling.”… This is what has been
dubbed the “contraception mandate” (the
“Mandate”), and it brooks no exception for
those, like the Appellants, who believe that
supporting the use of certain contraceptives
is morally reprehensible and contrary to
God's word. If the Hahns fail to have
Conestoga submit to the offending
regulations, the company will be subject to a
“regulatory tax”—a penalty or fine—that
will amount to about $95,000 per day and
will rapidly destroy the business and the 950
jobs that go with it…
II. Standard of Review
To qualify for preliminary injunctive relief,
a litigant must demonstrate “(1) a likelihood
of success on the merits; (2) that it will
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suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is
denied; (3) that granting preliminary relief
will not result in even greater harm to the
nonmoving party; and (4) that the public
interest favors such relief.” “We review the
denial of a preliminary injunction for an
abuse of discretion, an error of law, or a
clear mistake in the consideration of proof,”
and “any determination that is a prerequisite
to the issuance of an injunction is reviewed
according to the standard applicable to that
particular determination.”… Highly relevant
to this case, “a court of appeals must reverse
if the district court has proceeded on the
basis of an erroneous view of the applicable
law.”
The Majority gives short shrift to the dispute
over the standard of review that emerged
during the earlier appeal in this case. My
colleagues say simply that “[a] plaintiff's
failure to establish any element in its favor
renders
a
preliminary
injunction
inappropriate.” That may be true, but it fails
to address the problem that arose from the
District Court's erroneous application of a
more rigid standard than our case law
requires…
It is true that we have not used the label
“sliding scale” to describe our standard for
preliminary injunctions, as numerous other
circuit courts of appeals have. But we have
said that, “in a situation where factors of
irreparable harm, interests of third parties
and public considerations strongly favor the
moving party, an injunction might be
appropriate even though plaintiffs did not
demonstrate as strong a likelihood of
ultimate success as would generally be

required.”… The Court thus erred, and we
should say so.
Unlike the Majority, which tacitly endorses
the District Court's application of an
incorrect and unduly restrictive standard of
review, I would apply the standard
mandated by our own case law and used in
the vast majority of our sister circuits.
III. Discussion
The Majority, like the District Court,
evaluates only one of the four preliminary
injunction factors: the likelihood of the
Hahns' and Conestoga's success on the
merits. Holding that the “Appellants have
failed to show that they are likely to succeed
on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause
and RFRA claims,” the Majority “[does] not
decide whether Appellants have shown that
they will suffer irreparable harm, that
granting preliminary relief will not result in
even greater harm to the Government, [or]
that the public interest favors the relief of a
preliminary injunction.” My colleagues
thereby avoid addressing, let alone
weighing, the additional factors. I believe
that they are wrong about the likelihood of
success that both the Hahns and Conestoga
should be credited with, and I am further
persuaded that the remaining three factors,
particularly the showing of irreparable harm,
weigh overwhelmingly in favor of relief…
A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits
This case is one of many filed against the
government in recent months by for-profit
corporations and their owners seeking
protection from the Mandate. So far, most of
those cases have reached the preliminary
37

injunction stage only, and a clear majority of
courts has determined that temporary
injunctive relief is in order. I join that
consensus, and note also the recent en banc
decision of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit holding that
two for-profit companies had “established
[that] they are likely to succeed on their
RFRA claim” and that the Mandate
threatened them with irreparable harm.
…“[L]ikelihood of success” means that a
plaintiff has “a reasonable chance, or
probability, of winning.”… In the sense
pertinent here, the term “likelihood”
embodies “[t]he quality of offering a
prospect of success,” or showing some
promise. The Appellants have shown the
requisite prospect of success.
1. Conestoga's Right to Assert RFRA and
First Amendment Claims
I begin where the Majority begins and ends,
with the issue of Conestoga's claim to
religious liberty…
The Majority declares that there is no
“history of courts providing free exercise
protection to corporations.” As my
colleagues see it, “ ‘[r]eligious belief takes
shape within the minds and hearts of
individuals, and its protection is one of the
more uniquely human rights provided by the
Constitution’ ” so religion must be “an
inherently ‘human’ right” that cannot be
exercised by a corporation like Conestoga.
That reasoning fails for several reasons.
First, to the extent it depends on the
assertion that collective entities, including
corporations, have no religious rights, it is

plainly wrong, as numerous Supreme Court
decisions have recognized the right of
corporations to enjoy the free exercise of
religion…
The Majority slips away from its own
distinction between for-profit and non-profit
entities when it tries to support its holding
with a citation to the Supreme Court's
observation that the Free Exercise Clause “
‘secure[s] religious liberty in the individual
by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil
authority.’ ” If that out-of-context clause
really meant, as the Majority argues, that the
right was limited to individuals, then all
groups would be left in the cold, not just forprofit corporations. But that is manifestly
not what the quoted language means…
Religious opinions and faith are in this
respect akin to political opinions and
passions, which are held and exercised both
individually and collectively…. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has specifically “rejected the
argument that political speech of
corporations or other associations should be
treated differently under the First
Amendment
simply
because
such
associations are not ‘natural persons.’ ” It
thus does nothing to advance the discussion
to say that the Free Exercise Clause secures
religious liberty to individuals. Of course it
does. That does not mean that associations
of individuals, including corporations, lack
free exercise rights.
I am not suggesting that corporations enjoy
all of the same constitutionally grounded
rights as individuals do….
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Contrary to the Majority's conclusion, there
is nothing about the “nature, history, and
purpose” of religious exercise that limits it
to individuals. Quite the opposite; believers
have from time immemorial sought strength
in numbers. They lift one another's faith and,
through their combined efforts, increase
their capacity to meet the demands of their
doctrine. The use
of the word
“congregation” for
religious
groups
developed for a reason…
As the government and the Majority see it,
religious rights are more limited than other
kinds of First Amendment rights. All groups
can enjoy secular free expression and rights
to
assembly,
but
only
“religious
organizations” have a right to religious
liberty. Of course, that view leaves it to the
government to decide what qualifies as a
“religious organization,” which ought to
give people serious pause since one of the
central purposes of the First Amendment is
to keep the government out of the sphere of
religion entirely.
Assuming, however, that the government
had the competence to decide who is
religious enough to qualify as a “religious
organization,” there is no reason to suppose
that the Free Exercise guarantee is as limited
as the government claims or the Majority
accepts. Our Constitution recognizes the free
exercise of religion as something in addition
to other kinds of expression, not because it
requires less deference, but arguably
because it requires more. At the very least, it
stands on an equal footing with the other
protections of the First Amendment. The
values protected by the religious freedom
clauses of the First Amendment “have been

zealously protected, sometimes even at the
expense of other interests of admittedly high
social importance.”…
But even if it were appropriate to ignore the
Supreme Court's advice and focus on the
person asserting the right rather than on the
right at stake, there is a blindness to the idea
that an organization like a closely held
corporation is something other than the
united voices of its individual members. The
Majority detects no irony in its adoption of
the District Court's comment that “
‘[r]eligious belief takes shape within the
minds and hearts of individuals, and its
protection is one of the more uniquely
human rights provided by the Constitution’ ”
while it is simultaneously denying religious
liberty to Conestoga, an entity that is
nothing more than the common vision of
five individuals from one family who are of
one heart and mind about their religious
belief.
Acknowledging
“the
Hahns'
commitment to the Mennonite faith” on one
hand, while on the other acting as if the
Hahns do not even exist and are not having
their “uniquely human rights” trampled on is
more than a little jarring.
And what is the rationale for this “I can't see
you” analysis? It is that for-profit
corporations like Conestoga were “created
to make money.” It is the profit-making
character of the corporation, not the
corporate form itself, that the Majority treats
as decisively disqualifying Conestoga from
seeking the protections of the First
Amendment or RFRA. That argument treats
the line between profit-motivated and nonprofit entities as much brighter than it
actually is, since for-profit corporations
39

pursue non-profit goals on a regular basis.
More important for present purposes,
however, the kind of distinction the majority
draws between for-profit corporations and
non-profit corporations has been considered
and expressly rejected in other First
Amendment cases…
The forceful dissent of Judge John T.
Noonan, Jr., in EEOC v. Townley Eng'g &
Mfg. Co., put the point plainly:
The First Amendment, guaranteeing the
free exercise of religion to every person
within the nation, is a guarantee that
[for-profit corporations may] rightly
invoke[ ]. Nothing in the broad sweep of
the amendment puts corporations outside
its scope. Repeatedly and successfully,
corporations have appealed to the
protection the Religious Clauses afford
or authorize. Just as a corporation enjoys
the right of free speech guaranteed by
the First Amendment, so a corporation
enjoys the right guaranteed by the First
Amendment to exercise religion.
The First Amendment does not say that
only one kind of corporation enjoys this
right. The First Amendment does not say
that only religious corporations or only
not-for-profit corporations are protected.
The First Amendment does not authorize
Congress to pick and choose the persons
or the entities or the organizational
forms that are free to exercise their
religion. All persons—and under our
Constitution all corporations are
persons—are free. A statute cannot
subtract from their freedom.
Oddly, the government's opposing view,
adopted by the Majority, appears to be itself
a species of religion, based on the idea that
seeking after filthy lucre is sin enough to

deprive one of constitutional protection, and
taking “[t]he theological position ... that
human beings should worship God on
Sundays or some other chosen day and go
about their business without reference to
God the rest of the time.” There is certainly
in the text of the Constitution no support for
this peculiar doctrine, and what precedent
there is on the role of religion in the world
of commerce is to the contrary. As the Tenth
Circuit sitting en banc noted in Hobby
Lobby, the Supreme Court's decisions
establish that Free Exercise rights do not
evaporate when one is involved in a forprofit business.
So, to recap, it is not the corporate form
itself that can justify discriminating against
Conestoga, and it is not the pursuit of profits
that can justify it. Yet somehow, by the
miracle-math employed by HHS and its
lawyers, those two negatives add up to a
positive right in the government to
discriminate against a for-profit corporation.
Thus, despite the Supreme Court's insistence
that “no official, high or petty, can prescribe
what shall be orthodox in politics,
nationalism, religion, or other matters of
opinion or force citizens to confess by word
or act their faith therein,” the government
claims the right to force Conestoga and its
owners to facilitate the purchase and use of
contraceptive drugs and devices, including
abortifacients, all the while telling them that
they do not even have a basis to speak up in
opposition. Remarkable.
I reject that power grab and would hold that
Conestoga may invoke the right to religious
liberty on its own behalf.
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2. The Appellants' RFRA Claim
Turning to the merits of the Appellants'
RFRA claim, I am satisfied that both
Conestoga and the Hahns have shown a
likelihood of success. RFRA has been called
the “most important congressional action
with respect to religion since the First
Congress proposed the First Amendment,”
and it exists specifically to provide
heightened protection to the free exercise of
religion…
In short, RFRA restores the judicial standard
of review known as “strict scrutiny,” which
is “the most demanding test known to
constitutional law.” The statute prohibits the
Federal government from “substantially
burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion
even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability,” except when the
government can “demonstrat[e] that
application of the burden to the person—(1)
is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least
restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.” The
term “exercise of religion” “includes any
exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of
religious belief.” A person whose religious
practices are burdened in violation of RFRA
“may assert that violation as a claim or
defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain
appropriate relief.”
a. Substantial Burden
Under RFRA, “a rule imposes a substantial
burden on the free exercise of religion if it
prohibits a practice that is both sincerely

held by and rooted in the religious beliefs of
the party asserting the claim.” Within the
related context of the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, a
“substantial burden” exists where: (1) “a
follower is forced to choose between
following the precepts of his religion and
forfeiting benefits otherwise generally
available to other [persons] versus
abandoning one of the precepts of his
religion in order to receive a benefit”; or (2)
“the government puts substantial pressure on
an adherent to substantially modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs.”
The substantial burden test derives from the
Supreme Court's decisions in Sherbert and
Yoder. In Sherbert, the Court held that a
state's denial of unemployment benefits to a
Seventh–Day Adventist for refusing to work
on Saturdays substantially burdened the
exercise of her religious belief against
working on Saturdays…
And in Yoder the Court held that a
compulsory
school
attendance
law
substantially burdened the religious exercise
of Amish parents who refused to send their
children to high school. The burden in Yoder
was a fine of between five and fifty dollars.
The Court held that burden to be “not only
severe, but inescapable,” requiring the
parents “to perform acts undeniably at odds
with fundamental tenets of their religious
belief.”
The District Court here failed to appreciate
the applicability of those precedents. It held,
for two reasons, that the burden imposed by
the Mandate on Conestoga and the Hahns
was insubstantial. First, it said that
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Conestoga, as a for-profit corporation, lacks
religious rights and so can suffer no burden
on them, and, relatedly, that any harm to the
Hahns' religious liberty is “too attenuated to
be substantial” because it is Conestoga, not
they, that must face the Mandate. That line
of argument is fallacious, for the reasons I
have just discussed and will not repeat.
Relying on the recently reversed panel
decision in Hobby Lobby, the District
Court's second line of argument was that
“the Hahns have not demonstrated that [the
Mandate] constitute[s] a substantial burden
upon their religion,” because “the ultimate
and deeply private choice to use an
abortifacient contraceptive rests not with the
Hahns, but with Conestoga's employees.” As
the District Court saw it, “any burden
imposed by the regulations is too attenuated
to be considered substantial” because “[a]
series of events must first occur before the
actual use of an abortifacient would come
into play,” including that “the payment for
insurance [must be made] to a group health
insurance plan that will cover contraceptive
services ...; the abortifacients must be made
available to Conestoga employees through a
pharmacy or other healthcare facility; and a
decision must be made by a Conestoga
employee and her doctor, who may or may
not choose to avail themselves to these
services.” “Such an indirect and attenuated
relationship,” the Court held, “appears
unlikely to establish the necessary
substantial burden.”
The problem with that reasoning is that it
fundamentally misapprehends the substance
of the Hahns' claim. As the Seventh Circuit
rightly pointed out when granting an

injunction in the Mandate case before it,
“[t]he religious-liberty violation at issue
here inheres in the coerced coverage of
contraception, abortifacients, sterilization,
and related services, not—or perhaps more
precisely, not only—in the later purchase or
use of contraception or related services.” In
requiring them to provide the offending
insurance coverage, the Mandate requires
the Hahns and Conestoga to take direct
actions that violate the tenets of their
Mennonite faith, with the threat of severe
penalties for non-compliance…
Even if Conestoga's and the Hahns' only
religious objection were the ultimate use of
the offending contraceptives by Conestoga
employees, however, the fact that the final
decision on use involves a series of subdecisions does not render the burden on their
religious exercise insubstantial. Nothing in
RFRA suggests that indirect pressure cannot
violate the statute. Indeed, even though a
burden may be characterized as “indirect,”
“the Supreme Court has indicated that
indirectness is not a barrier to finding a
substantial burden.” The claimant in Thomas
v. Review Board of Indiana Employment
Security Division, quit his job because,
based on his religious beliefs, he could not
work in a factory that produced tank turrets.
The state denied him unemployment
benefits and argued that his objection was
unfounded because he had been willing to
work in a different factory that produced
materials that might be used for tanks. The
Supreme Court held that, in determining
whether Thomas's religious beliefs were
burdened, it could not second-guess his
judgment about what connection to
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armament production was unacceptably
close for him…
Moreover, if the indirectness of the ultimate
decision to use contraceptives truly rendered
insubstantial the harm to an employer, then
no exemptions to the Mandate would be
necessary...
It is true, as the Supreme Court cautioned in
United States v. Lee, that “every person
cannot be shielded from all the burdens
incident to exercising every aspect of the
right to practice religious beliefs… [T]he
Court held that the requirement to pay
Social Security taxes substantially burdened
a for-profit Amish employer's religious
exercise…
Thus, I would hold that the District Court
erred in concluding that the Mandate does
not substantially burden Conestoga's and the
Hahns' free exercise of religion.
b. Strict Scrutiny
If government action “substantially burdens”
religious exercise, it will be upheld under
RFRA only if it “is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest,” and “is
the least restrictive means” of accomplishing
that interest. Neither the Majority nor the
District Court addressed that strict scrutiny
test, because they disposed of the case on
other grounds… Only the feeblest
application of strict scrutiny could result in
upholding the Mandate on this record.
i. Compelling Interest
Compelling interests are those “of the
highest order” or “paramount interests.” The

government maintains that the Mandate
advances two compelling governmental
interests: “public health and gender
equality.”…
Preserving public health and ending gender
discrimination are indeed of tremendous
societal significance. The government can
certainly claim “a compelling interest in
safeguarding the public health by regulating
the health care and insurance markets.”…
Assuming for the sake of discussion that the
Mandate may actually advance those
interests, it must nevertheless be observed
that the mere “invocation” of a “general
interest in promoting public health and
safety [or, for that matter, gender equality]
... is not enough” under RFRA. The
government must show that the application
of the Mandate to the Hahns and Conestoga
in particular furthers those compelling
interests…
The government's arguments against
accommodating the Hahns and Conestoga
are “undermined by the existence of
numerous exemptions [it has already made]
to the ... mandate.” By its own choice, the
government has exempted an enormous
number of employers from the Mandate,
including “religious employers” who appear
to share the same religious objection as
Conestoga and the Hahns, leaving tens of
millions of employees and their families
untouched by it… So, when the
government's proffered compelling interest
applies equally to employers subject to a law
and those exempt from it, “it is difficult to
see how [the] same findings [supporting the
government's interest] alone can preclude
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any consideration of a similar exception” for
a similarly situated plaintiff…
ii. Least Restrictive Means
Nor can the government affirmatively
establish that the Mandate is the least
restrictive means of advancing its interests
in health and gender equality. Statutes fail
the “least restrictive means” test when they
are “overbroad” or “underinclusive.” The
underinclusiveness here is manifest, as just
described…
The Hahns and Conestoga argue that the
government could directly further its interest
in providing greater access to contraception
without violating their religious exercise…
In response, the government argues that the
Appellants misunderstand the leastrestrictive-means test and that their proposed
alternatives “would require federal taxpayers
to pay the cost of contraceptive services for
the employees of for-profit, secular
companies.”
It is the government that evidently
misunderstands the test, for while the
government need not address every
conceivable alternative, it “must refute the
alternative schemes offered by the
challenger,” ultimately settling on a policy
that is “necessary” to achieving its
compelling goals. And it must seek out
religiously neutral alternatives before
choosing policies that impinge on religious
liberty. In those responsibilities, the
government has utterly failed… Because the
government has not refuted that it could
satisfy its interests in the wider distribution
of contraception through any or all of the

means suggested by Conestoga and the
Hahns, without burdening their rights to
religious liberty, the government has not
shown that the Mandate is the least
restrictive means of addressing those
interests…
Accordingly, the government has not met
the burdens of strict scrutiny, and I would
hold that Conestoga and the Hahns have
established a likelihood of succeeding on the
merits of their RFRA claim.
3. The Appellants' First Amendment
Claim
Conestoga and the Hahns also bring a
separate claim under the First Amendment.
As previously discussed, the Supreme Court
in Smith held that the Free Exercise Clause
is not implicated when the government
burdens a person's religious exercise through
laws that are neutral and generally
applicable…
In my view, the Mandate is not generally
applicable, and it is not neutral. “A law fails
the general applicability requirement if it
burdens a category of religiously motivated
conduct but exempts or does not reach a
substantial category of conduct that is not
religiously motivated and that undermines
the purposes of the law to at least the same
degree as the covered conduct that is
religiously motivated.” Here, as already
noted, the government has provided
numerous exemptions, large categories of
which
are
unrelated
to
religious
objections… And it seems less than neutral
to say that some religiously motivated
employers—the ones picked by the
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government—are exempt while others are
not… Under the First Amendment,
therefore, the Mandate is to be subjected to
strict scrutiny. As discussed above in
relation to the RFRA claim brought by
Conestoga and the Hahns, the Mandate does
not pass that daunting test, and, accordingly,
they have demonstrated a reasonable
likelihood of succeeding on their First
Amendment claim.

C. The Remaining Injunction Factors

Focusing only on the question of likelihood
of success on the merits, neither the District
Court nor the Majority evaluated whether
Conestoga and the Hahns have demonstrated
irreparable harm…

Conestoga and the Hahns have also met the
remaining preliminary injunction factors. A
preliminary injunction would not result in
greater harm to the government but would
merely restore the status quo between the
parties…. [T]he harm to Conestoga and the
Hahns caused by the denial of the
preliminary injunction vastly outweighs the
harm to the government were an injunction
to be granted… Although a preliminary
injunction in this case might “temporarily
interfere[ ] with the government's goal of
increasing cost-free access to contraception
and sterilization,” that interest “is
outweighed by the harm to the substantial
religious-liberty interests on the other side.”

“Irreparable harm is injury for which a
monetary award cannot be adequate
compensation.”…
Threats
to
First
Amendment rights are often seen as so
potentially harmful that they justify a lower
threshold of proof to show a likelihood of
success on the merits.

In addition, a preliminary injunction would
not harm the public interest… An injunction
would simply put Conestoga's employees in
the same position as the tens of millions of
employees and their families whose
employers have already been exempted from
the Mandate.

B. Irreparable Harm

Because the government demanded that the
Hahns and Conestoga capitulate before their
appeal was even heard, and because the
District Court denied preliminary injunctive
relief, the severe hardship has begun. Faced
with ruinous fines, the Hahns and Conestoga
are being forced to pay for the offending
contraceptives, including abortifacients, in
violation of their religious convictions, and
every day that passes under those conditions
is a day in which irreparable harm is
inflicted…

IV. Conclusion
This is a controversial […] but in the final
analysis it should not be hard for us to join
the many courts across the country that have
looked at the Mandate and concluded that
the government should be enjoined from
telling sincere believers in the sanctity of
life to put their consciences aside and
support other people's reproductive choices.
The District Court's ruling should be
reversed and a preliminary injunction should
issue.
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TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judge
This case requires us to determine whether
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and
the Free Exercise Clause protect the
plaintiffs—two companies and their owners
who run their businesses to reflect their
religious values. The companies are Hobby
Lobby, a craft store chain, and Mardel, a
Christian bookstore chain. Their owners, the
Greens, run both companies as closely held
family businesses and operate them
according to a set of Christian principles.
They contend regulations implementing the
2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act force them to violate their sincerely held
religious beliefs. In particular, the plaintiffs
brought an action challenging a regulation
that requires them, beginning July 1, 2013,
to provide certain contraceptive services as a
part of their employer-sponsored health care
plan. Among these services are drugs and
devices that the plaintiffs believe to be
abortifacients, the use of which is contrary
to their faith.
We hold that Hobby Lobby and Mardel are
entitled to bring claims under RFRA, have

established a likelihood of success that their
rights under this statute are substantially
burdened by the contraceptive-coverage
requirement, and have established an
irreparable harm. But we remand the case to
the district court for further proceedings on
two of the remaining factors governing the
grant or denial of a preliminary injunction…
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below
and exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(a)(1), we reverse the district court's
denial of the plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction and remand with
instructions that the district court address the
remaining two preliminary injunction factors
and then assess whether to grant or deny the
plaintiffs' motion.
I. Background & Procedural History
A. The Plaintiffs
The plaintiffs in this case are David and
Barbara Green, their three children, and the
businesses they collectively own and
operate: Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and
Mardel, Inc. David Green is the founder of
46

Hobby Lobby, an arts and crafts chain with
over 500 stores and about 13,000 full-time
employees. Hobby Lobby is a closely held
family business organized as an S-corp…
Mart Green is the founder and CEO of
Mardel, an affiliated chain of thirty-five
Christian bookstores with just under 400
employees, also run on a for-profit basis.
As owners and operators of both Hobby
Lobby and Mardel, the Greens have
organized their businesses with express
religious principles in mind…
Furthermore, the Greens allow their faith to
guide business decisions for both
companies….
The Greens operate Hobby Lobby and
Mardel through a management trust (of
which each Green is a trustee), and that trust
is likewise governed by religious principles.
The trust exists “to honor God with all that
has been entrusted” to the Greens and to
“use the Green family assets to create,
support, and leverage the efforts of Christian
ministries.” The trustees must sign “a Trust
Commitment,” which among other things
requires them to affirm the Green family
statement of faith and to “regularly seek to
maintain a close intimate walk with the Lord
Jesus Christ by regularly investing time in
His Word and prayer.”
As is particularly relevant to this case, one
aspect of the Greens' religious commitment
is a belief that human life begins when
sperm fertilizes an egg…
B.
The
Requirement

Contraceptive–Coverage

Under the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA), employment-based group
health plans covered by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)
must provide certain types of preventive
health services. One provision mandates
coverage, without cost-sharing by plan
participants or beneficiaries, of “preventive
care and screenings” for women “as
provided for in comprehensive guidelines
supported by the Health Resources and
Services Administration [HRSA] .” HRSA
is an agency within the Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS).
When the ACA was enacted, there were no
HRSA guidelines related to preventive care
and screening for women. As a result, HHS
asked the Institute of Medicine [] to develop
recommendations to help implement these
requirements. In response, the Institute
issued a report recommending [] that the
guidelines require coverage for “ ‘[a]ll Food
and Drug Administration [FDA] approved
contraceptive
methods,
sterilization
procedures, and patient education and
counseling for all women with reproductive
capacity,’ as prescribed by a provider.”
HRSA
and
HHS
adopted
this
recommendation, meaning that employmentbased group health plans covered by ERISA
now
must
include
FDA-approved
contraceptive methods… Four of the twenty
approved
methods—two
types
of
intrauterine devices (IUDs) and the
emergency contraceptives commonly known
as Plan B and Ella—can function by
preventing the implantation of a fertilized
egg. The remaining methods function by
preventing fertilization.
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C. Exemptions from the Contraceptive–
Coverage Requirement
A number of entities are partially or fully
exempted from the contraceptive-coverage
requirement.
First, HHS “may establish exemptions” for
“group health plans established or
maintained by religious employers and
health insurance coverage provided in
connection with group health plans
established or maintained by religious
employers with respect to any requirement
to cover contraceptive services....”
HHS regulations currently define a
“religious employer” as an organization that:
(1) has the inculcation of religious values as
its purpose; (2) primarily employs persons
who share its religious tenets; (3) primarily
serves persons who share its religious tenets;
and (4) is a non-profit organization
described in a provision of the Internal
Revenue Code that refers to churches, their
integrated auxiliaries, conventions or
associations of churches, and to the
exclusively religious activities of any
religious order.
This definition of religious employer might
change, however, as the federal agencies
responsible for implementing the preventive
services portion of the ACA have proposed
a new rule that would eliminate the first
three requirements above and clarify that the
exemption is available to all non-profit
organizations falling within the scope of a
certain Internal Revenue Code provision.
Second, the government has proposed an
accommodation for certain other non-profit

organizations,
including
religious
institutions of higher education, that have
maintained
religious
objections
to
contraceptive coverage yet will not fall
within the amended definition of a religious
employer…
Third, if a business does not make certain
significant changes to its health plans after
the ACA's effective date, those plans are
considered “grandfathered” and are exempt
from
the
contraceptive-coverage
requirement. Grandfathered plans may
remain so indefinitely.
Fourth, businesses with fewer than fifty
employees are not required to participate in
employer-sponsored health plans…
Relying on information released by the
White House and HHS, the plaintiffs
estimate that at least 50 million people, and
perhaps over a 100 million, are covered by
exempt health plans. The government argues
that the number of grandfathered health
plans will decline over time, that
grandfathered plans may already cover the
objected-to contraceptives, and that financial
incentives exist to push small businesses
into the health insurance market, in which
case they would have to comply with the
contraceptive-coverage requirement…
No exemption, proposed or otherwise,
would extend to for-profit organizations like
Hobby Lobby or Mardel. And the various
government agencies responsible for
implementing the exceptions to the
contraceptive-coverage requirement have
announced that no proposed exemption will
extend to for-profit entities under any
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circumstances because of what the
government
considers
an
important
distinction, discussed further below,
between for-profit and non-profit status.
D. The Expected Effect of the
Contraceptive–Coverage Requirement
The Greens run the Hobby Lobby health
plan, a self-insured plan, which provides
insurance to both Hobby Lobby and Mardel
employees. Hobby Lobby and Mardel
cannot qualify for the “grandfathered” status
exemption because they elected not to
maintain grandfathered status prior to the
date that the contraceptive-coverage
requirement was proposed.
Nevertheless, the Greens object to providing
coverage
for
any
FDA-approved
contraceptives
that
would
prevent
implantation of a fertilized egg. Because the
Greens believe that human life begins at
conception, they also believe that they
would be facilitating harms against human
beings if the Hobby Lobby health plan
provided coverage for the four FDAapproved contraceptive methods that prevent
uterine implantation (Ella, Plan B, and the
two IUDs). The government does not
dispute the sincerity of this belief.
The Greens present no objection to
providing coverage for the sixteen
remaining contraceptive methods…
According to the plaintiffs, the corporations'
deadline to comply with the contraceptivecoverage requirement is July 1, 2013. If the
Hobby Lobby health plan does not cover all
twenty contraceptive methods by that date,
the businesses will be exposed to immediate

tax penalties, potential regulatory action,
and possible private lawsuits.
The most immediate consequence for Hobby
Lobby and Mardel would come in the form
of regulatory taxes: $100 per day for each
“individual to whom such failure relates.”
The plaintiffs assert that because more than
13,000 individuals are insured under the
Hobby Lobby plan (which includes Mardel),
this fine would total at least $1.3 million per
day, or almost $475 million per year… If the
corporations instead drop employee health
insurance altogether, they will face penalties
of $26 million per year.
E. Procedural History
The plaintiffs filed suit on September 12,
2012, challenging the contraceptivecoverage requirement under RFRA, the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
and the Administrative Procedure Act. The
plaintiffs simultaneously moved for a
preliminary injunction on the basis of their
RFRA and Free Exercise claims. The district
court denied that motion.
The plaintiffs then appealed the denial of the
preliminary injunction and moved for
injunctive relief pending appeal. A twojudge panel denied relief pending appeal,
adopting substantially the same reasoning as
the district court. The plaintiffs then sought
emergency relief under the All Writs Act
from the Supreme Court, which also denied
relief.
The plaintiffs subsequently moved for initial
en banc consideration of this appeal, citing
the exceptional importance of the questions
presented. We granted that motion. And
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given Hobby Lobby and Mardel's July 1
deadline
for
complying
with
the
contraceptive-coverage requirement, we
granted the plaintiffs' motion to expedite
consideration of this appeal.

We begin by examining whether Hobby
Lobby and Mardel have standing to sue in
federal court. Article III of the Constitution
limits federal judicial power to “Cases” and
“Controversies.”…

II. The Religious Freedom Restoration
Act

We conclude that Hobby Lobby and Mardel
have Article III standing. Both companies
face an imminent loss of money, traceable to
the contraceptive-coverage requirement.
Both would receive redress if a court holds
the contraceptive-coverage requirement
unenforceable as to them…

Hobby Lobby and Mardel's central claims
here arise under the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act. A plaintiff makes a prima
facie case under RFRA by showing that the
government substantially burdens a sincere
religious exercise. The burden then shifts to
the government to show that the
“compelling interest test is satisfied through
application of the challenged law ‘to the
person’—the particular claimant whose
sincere exercise of religion is being
substantially burdened.”…
The principal questions we must resolve
here include: (1) whether Hobby Lobby and
Mardel are “persons” exercising religion for
purposes of RFRA; (2) if so, whether the
corporations'
religious
exercise
is
substantially burdened; and (3) if there is a
substantial burden, whether the government
can demonstrate a narrowly tailored
compelling government interest.

B. The Anti–Injunction Act
A second possible impediment to our
subject-matter jurisdiction is the Anti–
Injunction Act (AIA). Although the
plaintiffs and the government agree that the
AIA does not apply here, “subject-matter
jurisdiction, because it involves a court's
power to hear a case, can never be forfeited
or waived.”…
The AIA dictates, with statutory exceptions
inapplicable to this case, that “no suit for the
purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in
any court by any person, whether or not
such person is the person against whom such
tax was assessed.”…

III. Subject–Matter Jurisdiction
Before turning to the preliminary injunction
standard, we must resolve two issues that
bear on our subject-matter jurisdiction—
standing and the Anti–Injunction Act.
A. Standing

In this case, the corporations' challenge
relates to the government's authority under
26 U.S.C. § 4980D, which imposes a “tax”
on any employer that does not meet the
ACA's health insurance requirements,
including
the
contraceptive-coverage
requirement… If an employer fails to
provide health insurance, the employer is
subject to a tax under § 4980H. And, as the
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Supreme Court recently instructed, when
Congress uses the term “tax,” it is a strong
indication that Congress intends the AIA to
apply.

irreparable harm to the movant; (3) the harm
alleged by the movant outweighs any harm
to the non-moving party; and (4) an
injunction is in the public interest.

Still, the AIA does not apply to every
lawsuit “tangentially related to taxes,” and
the corporations' suit is not challenging the
IRS's ability to collect taxes… [Rather,]
Hobby Lobby and Mardel are not seeking to
enjoin the collection of taxes or the
execution of any IRS regulation; they are
seeking to enjoin the enforcement, by
whatever method, of one HHS regulation
that they claim violates their RFRA rights.

Hobby Lobby and Mardel urge that we
apply a relaxed standard under which it can
meet its burden for a preliminary injunction
by showing the second, third, and fourth
factors “tip strongly in [its] favor.”… But
we need not resolve whether this relaxed
standard would apply here, given that a
majority of the court holds that Hobby
Lobby and Mardel have satisfied the
likelihood-of-success prong under the
traditional standard.

Indeed, a regulatory tax is just one of many
collateral consequences that can result from
a failure to comply with the contraceptivecoverage requirement.
And just as the AIA does not apply to any
suit against the individual mandate, which is
enforced by the IRS, so too does the AIA
not apply to any suit against the
contraceptive-coverage requirement, even
though it also may be enforced by the IRS…
Both sides agree that the AIA should not
apply for essentially these same reasons. We
are convinced by this reasoning and proceed
to resolve the merits of the RFRA claim.
IV. Preliminary Injunction Standard
…We review the denial of a preliminary
injunction for abuse of discretion…
Under the traditional four-prong test for a
preliminary injunction, the party moving for
an injunction must show: (1) a likelihood of
success on the merits; (2) a likely threat of

The district court ruled that the corporations
failed the likelihood-of-success element
because even closely held family businesses
like Hobby Lobby and Mardel are not
protected by RFRA.
We disagree with this conclusion and
determine that the contraceptive-coverage
requirement substantially burdens Hobby
Lobby and Mardel's rights under RFRA.
And at this stage, the government has not
shown a narrowly tailored compelling
interest to justify this burden.
V. Merits
A. Hobby Lobby and Mardel Are
“Persons Exercising Religion” Under
RFRA
RFRA provides, as a general rule, that the
“Government shall not substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion.” The parties
dispute whether for-profit corporations, such
as Hobby Lobby and Mardel, are persons
exercising religion for purposes of RFRA.
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We thus turn to the question of whether
Hobby Lobby, as a family owned business
furthering its religious mission, and Mardel,
as a Christian bookstore, can take advantage
of RFRA's protections.
The government makes two arguments for
why this is not the case. First, it cites to civil
rights statutes and labor laws that create an
exemption for religious organizations…The
government [] argues that, as a matter of
statutory interpretation, RFRA should be
read to carry forward the supposedly
preexisting distinction between non-profit,
religious corporations and for-profit, secular
corporations. Second, the government
asserts
that
the
for-profit/non-profit
distinction is rooted in the Free Exercise
Clause. It suggests Congress did not intend
RFRA to expand the scope of the Free
Exercise Clause. The government therefore
concludes RFRA does not extend to forprofit corporations.
We reject both of these arguments. First, we
hold as a matter of statutory interpretation
that Congress did not exclude for-profit
corporations from RFRA's protections. Such
corporations can be “persons” exercising
religion for purposes of the statute. Second,
as a matter of constitutional law, Free
Exercise rights may extend to some forprofit organizations.
1. Statutory Interpretation
a. The Dictionary Act
We begin with the statutory text. RFRA
contains no special definition of “person.”
Thus, our first resource in determining what
Congress meant by “person” in RFRA is the

Dictionary Act, which instructs: “In
determining the meaning of any Act of
Congress, unless the context indicates
otherwise * * * the word[ ] ‘person’ ...
include[s]
corporations,
companies,
associations, firms, partnerships, societies,
and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals.” Thus, we could end the matter
here since the plain language of the text
encompasses “corporations,” including ones
like Hobby Lobby and Mardel.
In addition, the Supreme Court has affirmed
the RFRA rights of corporate claimants,
notwithstanding the claimants' decision to
use the corporate form.
b. Other Statutes
Given that no one disputes at least some
types of corporate entities can bring RFRA
claims, the next question is whether
Congress intended to exclude for-profit
corporations, as opposed to non-profit
corporations, from RFRA's scope. Notably,
neither the Dictionary Act nor RFRA
explicitly distinguishes between for-profit
and non-profit corporations; the Dictionary
Act merely instructs that the term “persons”
includes corporations.
At the same time, we acknowledge the
Dictionary Act definition does not apply if
“the context indicates otherwise.” Generally,
“context” here “means the text of the Act of
Congress surrounding the word at issue, or
the text of other related congressional Acts.”
The government contends that RFRA's
“context” points to exemptions for religious
employers in other statutes, and in particular
it directs us to the religious exemptions
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contained in Title VII, the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), and the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA). But rather
than providing contextual support for
excluding for-profit corporations from
RFRA, we think these exemptions show that
Congress knows how to craft a corporate
religious exemption, but chose not to do so
in RFRA…
In short, the government believes Congress
used “person” in RFRA as extreme
shorthand for something like “natural person
or ‘religious organization’ as that term was
used
in
exemptions
for
religious
organizations as set forth in Title VII, the
ADA, and the NLRA.”
This reading strikes us as strained. Indeed,
the exemptions present in Title VII, the
ADA, and the NLRA suggest the opposite
inference from what the government draws.
Rather than implying that similar narrowing
constructions should be imported into
statutes that do not contain such language,
they imply Congress is quite capable of
narrowing the scope of a statutory
entitlement or affording a type of statutory
exemption when it wants to. The corollary to
this rule, of course, is that when the
exemptions are not present, it is not that they
are “carried forward” but rather that they do
not apply…

Congress's mind before it enacted RFRA.
We disagree with the government's
interpretation of Amos.
Amos involved employees of non-profit and
arguably non-religious businesses run by the
Mormon Church. These businesses had fired
certain Mormon employees who did not
follow church behavioral standards, and the
employees sued under Title VII. The Church
moved to dismiss based on Title VII's
exemption for “religious corporation[s].”…
The plaintiffs countered “that if construed to
allow religious employers to discriminate on
religious grounds in hiring for nonreligious
jobs, [the exemption] violates the
Establishment Clause.” The district court
agreed, reasoning in part that Title VII's
exemption unlawfully advanced religion
because it could “permit churches with
financial resources impermissibly to extend
their influence and propagate their faith by
entering the commercial, profit-making
world.”
The Supreme Court reversed. It concluded
this particular part of the district court's
reasoning was incorrect because it assumed
the existence of for-profit activities yet none
of the Mormon businesses at issue operated
on a for-profit basis. The Court never
reached the question of how for-profit
activity might have changed its analysis…

c. Case Law
The government nonetheless points to
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
v. Amos, for the idea that the for-profit/nonprofit distinction was well-established in

From these references to non-profit status in
Amos, the government concludes that the
for-profit/non-profit distinction matters a
great deal. But we do not see what the
government sees in Amos… At best [] Amos
leaves open the question of whether for-

53

profit status matters for Title VII's religious
employer exemption…
Nor do the other post-RFRA circuit cases on
which the government relies provide more
guidance…
In conclusion, the government has given us
no persuasive reason to think that Congress
meant “person” in RFRA to mean anything
other than its default meaning in the
Dictionary
Act—which
includes
corporations regardless of their profitmaking status.
2. Free Exercise
The government further argues that the
“[t]he distinction between non-profit,
religious organizations and for-profit,
secular companies is rooted in the text of the
First Amendment.” It claims this
understanding of the First Amendment
informed what Congress intended by
“person” in RFRA. Undoubtedly, Congress's
understanding of the First Amendment
informed its drafting of RFRA, but we see
no basis for concluding that such an
understanding
included
a
forprofit/nonprofit distinction.
a. RFRA's Purpose
RFRA was Congress's attempt to
legislatively overrule Employment Division
v. Smith. Smith had abrogated much of the
Supreme Court's earlier jurisprudence
regarding whether a neutral law of general
application
nonetheless
impermissibly
burdened a person's Free Exercise rights.
The pre-Smith test exempted such a person
from the law's constraints unless the

government could show a compelling need
to apply the law to the person. Smith
eliminated that test on the theory that the
Constitution permits burdening Free
Exercise if that burden results from a neutral
law of general application.
Congress responded to Smith by enacting
RFRA, which re-imposed a stricter standard
on both the states and the federal
government…
Congress, through RFRA, intended to bring
Free Exercise jurisprudence back to the test
established before Smith. There is no
indication Congress meant to alter any other
aspect of pre-Smith jurisprudence—
including jurisprudence regarding who can
bring Free Exercise claims. We therefore
turn to that jurisprudence.
b. Corporate and
Exercise Rights

For–Profit

Free

It is beyond question that associations—not
just individuals—have Free Exercise
rights…
Accordingly, the Free Exercise Clause is not
a “ ‘purely personal’ guarantee[ ] ...
unavailable to corporations and other
organizations because the ‘historic function’
of the particular [constitutional] guarantee
has been limited to the protection of
individuals.” As should be obvious, the Free
Exercise Clause at least extends to
associations like churches—including those
that incorporate…
In short, individuals may incorporate for
religious purposes and keep their Free
Exercise
rights,
and
unincorporated
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individuals may pursue profit while keeping
their Free Exercise rights…
This position is not “rooted in the text of the
First Amendment,” and therefore could not
have informed Congress's intent when
enacting RFRA. As an initial matter, the
debates in Congress surrounding the
adoption of the First Amendment
demonstrate an intent to protect a range of
conduct broader than the mere right to
believe whatever one chooses…
We [] believe that a constitutional
distinction would conflict with the Supreme
Court's Free Exercise precedent. First, we
cannot see why an individual operating forprofit retains Free Exercise protections but
an individual who incorporates—even as the
sole shareholder—does not, even though he
engages in the exact same activities as
before… Religious associations can
incorporate, gain those protections, and
nonetheless retain their Free Exercise rights.
Moreover, when the Supreme Court
squarely addressed for-profit individuals'
Free Exercise rights in Lee and Braunfeld,
its analysis did not turn on the individuals'
unincorporated status. Nor did the Court
suggest that the Free Exercise right would
have disappeared, using a more modern
formulation, in a general or limited
partnership, sole professional corporation,
LLC, S-corp, or closely held family business
like we have here.
In addition, sincerely religious persons could
find a connection between the exercise of
religion and the pursuit of profit…

We are also troubled—as we believe
Congress would be—by the notion that Free
Exercise rights turn on Congress's definition
of “non-profit.”…
[T]he government cites to the Supreme
Court's recent Hosanna–Tabor decision,
where the Court recognized a ministerial
exception that foreclosed review of the
propriety of the decision of a “church”
(understood in a broad sense that includes
all religions) to hire or retain a “minister”
(with the same broad meaning). In
recognizing this ministerial exception, the
Court found the exception precluded a claim
brought under the Americans with
Disabilities Act by a former employee of a
school run by a denomination of the
Lutheran church. The Court reiterated the
uncontroversial proposition that “the text of
the First Amendment ... gives special
solicitude to the rights of religious
organizations.” From this language, the
government draws a narrow application of
the Free Exercise Clause.
We do not share this interpretation. The
main point of the Court was that the
Religion Clauses add to the mix when
considering freedom of association. But it
does not follow that because religious
organizations obtain protections through the
Religion Clauses, all entities not included in
the definition of religious organization are
accorded no rights…
The government [also] raises the specter of
future cases in which, for example, a large
publicly traded corporation tries to assert
religious rights under RFRA. That would
certainly seem to raise difficult questions of
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how to determine the corporation's sincerity
of belief. But that is not an issue here…
[We find that] Hobby Lobby and Mardel []
qualify as “persons” under RFRA.
B. Substantial Burden
The next question is whether the
contraceptive-coverage
requirement
constitutes a substantial burden on Hobby
Lobby and Mardel's exercise of religion.
The government urges that there can be no
substantial burden here because “[a]n
employee's decision to use her health
coverage to pay for a particular item or
service cannot properly be attributed to her
employer.”…
This position is fundamentally flawed
because it advances an understanding of
“substantial
burden”
that
presumes
“substantial” requires an inquiry into the
theological merit of the belief in question
rather than the intensity of the coercion
applied by the government to act contrary to
those beliefs…
No one disputes in this case the sincerity of
Hobby Lobby and Mardel's religious beliefs.
And because the contraceptive-coverage
requirement places substantial pressure on
Hobby Lobby and Mardel to violate their
sincere religious beliefs, their exercise of
religion is substantially burdened within the
meaning of RFRA.
1. The Substantial Burden Test
Our most developed case discussing the
substantial burden test is Abdulhaseeb v.

Calbone. In Abdulhaseeb, we were required
to resolve a RFRA claim brought by [] a
Muslim prisoner who raised a religious
objection to the prison's failure to provide
him a halal diet. Abdulhaseeb alleged that
the prison cafeteria's failure to serve halal
food violated his rights under the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), a statute that adopts RFRA's
“substantial burden” standard.
In analyzing Abdulhaseeb's claim, we held
that a government act imposes a “substantial
burden” on religious exercise if it: (1)
“requires participation in an activity
prohibited by a sincerely held religious
belief,” (2) “prevents participation in
conduct motivated by a sincerely held
religious belief,” or (3) “places substantial
pressure on an adherent ... to engage in
conduct contrary to a sincerely held
religious belief.” Our analysis in
Abdulhaseeb only concerned the third prong
of this test, related to “substantial pressure.”
[T]he same is true here.
The substantial pressure prong rests firmly
on Supreme Court precedent, in particular:
Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana
Employment Security Division.
The plaintiff in Thomas was a Jehovah's
Witness who had worked for a company that
owned both a foundry and factory…
Although he had no objection to working in
the foundry, he raised a religious objection
to his factory job, claiming that “he could
not work on weapons without violating the
principles of his religion.” He quit his job
and was [] denied unemployment benefits.
He then challenged this decision as
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improperly burdening his right to exercise
his religion…
In considering the Free Exercise claim, the
Court noted that the plaintiff could not
clearly articulate the basis for the difference
between processing steel that might be used
in tanks and manufacturing the turrets
themselves. [The Court held that]
“[p]articularly in this sensitive area, it is not
within the judicial function and judicial
competence to inquire whether the petitioner
... correctly perceived the commands of [his]
faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural
interpretation.”…
Accepting the plaintiff's religious beliefs as
sincere, the Court then examined “the
coercive impact” upon him… On that score,
the Court found a substantial burden:
Where the state conditions receipt of an
important benefit upon conduct proscribed
by a religious faith, or where it denies such
a benefit because of conduct mandated by
religious belief, thereby putting substantial
pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs, a
burden upon religion exists. While the
compulsion may be indirect, the
infringement upon free exercise is
nonetheless substantial.
United States v. Lee similarly demonstrates
that the burden analysis does not turn on
whether the government mandate operates
directly or indirectly, but on the coercion the
claimant feels to violate his beliefs…
Given the foregoing, our first step in
Abdulhaseeb was to identify the belief in
question [] and to determine if the belief was
sincerely held. Finding it was, we stated that

“the issue is not whether the lack of a halal
diet that includes meats substantially
burdens the religious exercise of any
Muslim practitioner, but whether it
substantially burdens Mr. Abdulhaseeb's
own exercise of his sincerely held religious
beliefs.” We concluded that the prison
cafeteria's “failure to provide a halal diet
either prevents Mr. Abdulhaseeb's religious
exercise, or, at the least, places substantial
pressure on Mr. Abdulhaseeb not to engage
in his religious exercise by presenting him
with a Hobson's choice—either he eats a
non-halal diet in violation of his sincerely
held beliefs, or he does not eat.” Thus, the
plaintiff faced a substantial burden.
2. Applying the Substantial Burden Test
…First, we must identify the religious belief
in this case. The corporate plaintiffs believe
life begins at conception. Thus, they have
what they describe as “a sincere religious
objection to providing coverage for Plan B
and Ella...” And they allege a “sincere
religious objection to providing coverage for
certain contraceptive [IUDs]...”
Second, we must determine whether this
belief is sincere. The government does not
dispute the corporations' sincerity, and we
see no reason to question it either.
Third, we turn to the question of whether the
government places substantial pressure on
the religious believer. Here, it is difficult to
characterize the pressure as anything but
substantial…
[W]e believe that Hobby Lobby and Mardel
have made a threshold showing regarding a
substantial burden. Ordinarily, the question
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of substantial burden would involve
subsidiary factual issues. But in the district
court, the government did not question the
significance of the financial burden… Thus,
the district court record leaves only one
possible scenario: Hobby Lobby and Mardel
incurred a substantial burden on their ability
to exercise their religion because the law
requires Hobby Lobby and Mardel to:
• compromise their religious beliefs,
• pay close to $475 million more in taxes
every year, or
• pay roughly $26 million more in annual
taxes and drop health-insurance benefits for
all employees.
This is precisely the sort of Hobson's choice
described in Abdulhaseeb, and Hobby
Lobby and Mardel have established a
substantial burden as a matter of law.
…
C. Compelling Interest
Restrictive Means

and

Least

As noted above, even at the preliminary
injunction stage, RFRA requires the
government to demonstrate that mandating a
plaintiff's
compliance
with
the
contraceptive-coverage requirement is “the
least restrictive means of advancing a
compelling interest.”…
The interest must also be narrowly tailored.
“RFRA requires the Government to
demonstrate that the compelling interest test
is satisfied through application of the
challenged law ‘to the person’...”

The government asserts two interests here:
“the interests in [1] public health and [2]
gender equality.” We recognize the
importance of these interests. But they
nonetheless in this context do not satisfy the
Supreme Court's compelling interest
standards.
First, both interests as articulated by the
government are insufficient under O Centro
because they are “broadly formulated
interests justifying the general applicability
of government mandates.”…
Second, the interest here cannot be
compelling because the contraceptivecoverage requirement presently does not
apply to tens of millions of people…
2. Least Restrictive Means
Even if the government had stated a
compelling interest in public health or
gender equality, it has not explained how
those larger interests would be undermined
by granting Hobby Lobby and Mardel their
requested exemption…
3. Hobby Lobby and Mardel Employees
Finally, we note a concern raised both at
oral argument and in the government's
briefing that Hobby Lobby and Mardel are,
in effect, imposing their religious views on
their employees or otherwise burdening their
employees' religious beliefs. But Hobby
Lobby and Mardel do not prevent employees
from using their own money to purchase the
four contraceptives at issue here…

1. Compelling Interest
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In sum, for all of these reasons, Hobby
Lobby and Mardel have established they are
likely to succeed on their RFRA claim.
VI. Remaining Preliminary Injunction
Factors
Having concluded that Hobby Lobby and
Mardel are likely to succeed on the merits,
we turn to the remaining preliminary
injunction factors: whether Hobby Lobby
and Mardel face irreparable harm; whether
the balance of equities tips in Hobby Lobby
and Mardel's favor; and whether an
injunction is in the public interest. The
district court did not analyze these factors []
but Hobby Lobby and Mardel nonetheless
ask that we reach them.
A. Propriety of Reaching the Remaining
Factors
“If the district court fails to analyze the
factors necessary to justify a preliminary
injunction, this court may do so [in the first
instance] if the record is sufficiently
developed.” The record we have is the
record the parties chose to create below—it
is the record they deemed sufficient for the
district court to decide the preliminary
injunction question. For each element, we
believe this record suffices for us to resolve
each of the remaining preliminary injunction
factors…
[T]he government nowhere contested the
factual adequacy or accuracy of Hobby
Lobby and Mardel's allegations, and given
that those allegations were established
through a verified complaint, they are
deemed admitted for preliminary injunction
purposes.

In short, the record before us is enough to
resolve the remaining preliminary injunction
factors. Given Hobby Lobby and Mardel's
July 1 deadline, prudence strongly counsels
in favor of reaching those factors. Thus, we
would reach them and find that they favor
Hobby Lobby and Mardel…
B. Analysis of Remaining Factors
1. Irreparable Harm
Hobby Lobby and Mardel have established a
likely violation of RFRA. We have
explicitly held [] that establishing a likely
RFRA violation satisfies the irreparable
harm factor…
2. Balance of Equities
Nor is there any question about the balance
of equities. A preliminary injunction would
forestall the government's ability to extend
all twenty approved contraceptive methods
to Hobby Lobby and Mardel's 13,000
employees…
3. Public Interest
Finally, as stated above, “it is always in the
public interest to prevent the violation of a
party's
constitutional
rights.”…
[A]ccommodating the two companies in this
case does not undermine the application of
the contraceptive-coverage requirement to
the vast number of employers without
religious objections…
In sum, all preliminary injunction factors tip
in favor of Hobby Lobby and Mardel, and
we would therefore remand to the district
court with instructions to enter a preliminary
injunction.
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VII. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we reverse
the district court's denial of the plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction and
remand with instructions that the district
court address the remaining two preliminary
injunction factors and then assess whether to
grant or deny the plaintiffs' motion. The
Clerk is directed to issue the mandate
forthwith.
HARTZ, Circuit Judge, concurring:
I join Judge Tymkovich's opinion but write
separately to [express that] I think (1) that
all corporations come within the protection
of the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA and
(2) that the substantial-burden analysis here
is a simple one.
…
GORSUCH, joined by KELLY and
TYMKOVICH,
Circuit
Judges,
concurring.
…I write to explain why the Greens
themselves, as individuals, are also entitled
to relief and why the Anti–Injunction Act
does not preclude us from supplying that
relief…
No doubt, the Greens' religious convictions
are contestable. Some may even find the
Greens' beliefs offensive. But no one
disputes that they are sincerely held
religious beliefs…
I write to emphasize that, even if the parties
are wrong and the AIA does apply to this
case, it still wouldn't allow us to avoid

reaching the merits. It wouldn't because the
government has expressly waived any
reliance on the AIA: not only did it fail to
raise the AIA as a defense in the district
court, it discouraged us from applying the
statute when we invited additional briefing
on the matter. So long as the AIA affords the
government only a waivable defense—so
long as it doesn't impose on the courts a
jurisdictional limit on our statutory authority
to entertain this case—we are bound to
reach the merits. And a waivable defense,
we are persuaded, is all the AIA provides…
In the end, the AIA shows none of the
hallmarks of a jurisdictional restriction, and
has many features that collectively indicate
otherwise. The government can waive its
application, and it has done so before us.
Given that, we can be sure, perhaps doubly
sure, that reaching the merits of this case is
appropriate and indeed our duty.
BACHARACH, J., concurring.
…I believe that Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
and Mardel, Inc. are “persons” under the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act. I write
separately to:
• discuss the need for a remand so that the
district court can address the balancing
elements of the preliminary-injunction
inquiry and
• address prudential standing and conclude
that we should instruct the district court to
dismiss the Greens' claims.
I. The Need for Remand to the District
Court on the Balancing Elements
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I respectfully decline to join Parts VI(A),
(B)(2), and (B)(3) of the plurality opinion
because I believe that the required balancing
of interests should be conducted by the
district court rather than the court of
appeals…
The district court did err, as the plurality
concludes, by holding that Hobby Lobby
and Mardel are unlikely to succeed on the
merits. Still, Hobby Lobby and Mardel can
obtain a preliminary injunction only if they
persuade a court of three additional
elements: (1) irreparable injury; (2)
avoidance of injury to the public interest;
and (3) greater injury to themselves, if a
preliminary injunction were to be denied,
than to the defendants if a preliminary
injunction were to be granted. These
elements have not been addressed by the
district court…
In urging that we allow the district court to
balance the remaining elements, I am
mindful of the time pressures on the
courts—and on Hobby Lobby and Mardel—
as the deadline of July 1, 2013, approaches.
Still, I do not think these time pressures
should induce us to step outside of our
institutional limits and usurp a role better
suited to the district court.

whether the Greens' alleged injuries derive
solely from the injuries sustained by Hobby
Lobby and Mardel.
In my view, Congress did not abrogate
prudential-standing restrictions in RFRA,
and the Greens' claims derive solely from
the alleged injuries sustained by Hobby
Lobby and Mardel. As a result, I would
direct the district court to dismiss the
Greens' claims based on the shareholderstanding rule.
…
BRISCOE, Chief Judge, concurring in
part and dissenting in part, joined by
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
…I [] dissent from the majority's conclusion
that Hobby Lobby and Mardel have
established a substantial likelihood of
success on the merits of their RFRA claims,
and the majority's concomitant decision to
reverse the district court's denial of
plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunctive
relief.
I. The Anti–Injunction Act
…I [] concur in the conclusion that the AIA
does not bar the RFRA claims at issue in
this appeal.

II. The Greens' Standing to Sue in their
Personal Capacities

II. The Record on Appeal

[T]he plurality opinion states that we need
not address the Greens' standing. I believe,
however, that we should do so. In
addressing the Greens' standing, we should
consider whether Congress abrogated
prudential restrictions in RFRA and, if not,

…I fail to see how plaintiffs could
reasonably be said to have carried their
burden of establishing their entitlement to a
preliminary injunction. And, relatedly, I am
concerned,
given
these
evidentiary
deficiencies, about the majority's eagerness
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to issue seemingly definitive rulings on the
merits of plaintiffs' novel claim that forprofit corporations are entitled to coverage
under RFRA.
III. Are Hobby Lobby and Mardel
Persons Exercising Religion Under
RFRA?
In the first part of its merits analysis, the
majority addresses the question of whether
Hobby Lobby and Mardel qualify as
“persons exercising religion for purposes of
RFRA.” [T[he majority makes a number of
critical mistakes in doing so. And its
ultimate holding, which is unprecedented, is
sufficiently ambiguous that neither the
majority nor anyone else can confidently
predict where it may lead, particularly when
one considers how easily an “exercise of
religion” could now be asserted by a
corporation to avoid or take advantage of
any governmental rule or requirement.
…
I conclude on that basis that Hobby Lobby
and Mardel have failed to carry their burden
of establishing a likelihood of success on the
merits of their RFRA claims.
IV. Substantial Burden
In the second part of its merits analysis, the
majority addresses the question of “whether
the contraceptive-coverage requirement
constitutes a substantial burden on plaintiffs'
exercise of religion.”…
[P]laintiffs presented no evidence at all
during the hearing on their motion for
preliminary injunction. That failure is not

entirely fatal to their claims, because there
appears to be agreement among the parties
and amici that certain intrauterine devices
actually have, as a matter of scientific fact,
the potential to prevent implantation of a
fertilized egg. But there is no such
consensus with respect to the contraceptive
drugs challenged by the plaintiffs.
Consequently, plaintiffs' tactical decision to
present no evidence on this point appears, to
me, to prevent them from establishing that
the regulatory requirement to provide
healthcare coverage encompassing these
drugs substantially burdens their exercise of
religion.
V. Remaining Preliminary Injunction
Factors
I also believe that the plurality errs in its
consideration of the three remaining
preliminary injunction factors, i.e., whether
Hobby Lobby and Mardel face irreparable
harm, whether the balance of equities tips in
favor of Hobby Lobby and Mardel, and
whether an injunction is in the public
interest.
…
MATHESON, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part.
…
I. THE
CLAIM

CORPORATIONS'

RFRA

…I do not think the corporate plaintiffs have
demonstrated they can so easily disregard
the corporate form and assume the Greens'
religious beliefs. Accordingly, I do not think
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the district court abused its discretion in
holding that Hobby Lobby and Mardel failed
to show they are substantially likely to
succeed on the merits of their RFRA claim.
Nevertheless, I would stop at concluding
that the plaintiffs have not met their
preliminary injunction burden and would not
foreclose the issue of RFRA coverage for
secular, for-profit corporations from future
consideration. Prudential considerations of
judicial restraint take me to this position.
A. Plaintiffs' Failure to Meet Preliminary
Injunction Burden on Law and Facts
Chief Judge Briscoe raises serious concerns
about the majority's analysis and
conclusions. These concerns are sufficient to
conclude that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in denying a preliminary
injunction to Hobby Lobby and Mardel…
The allegations in the complaint suggest that
Hobby Lobby and Mardel have features that
could set them apart from other for-profit
businesses and even from each other, but the
plaintiffs provide no evidence in support.
The record does not allow meaningful
consideration of whether RFRA applies to
either of the two plaintiff corporations.
B. Disregarding the Corporate Form
…Perhaps Hobby Lobby, Mardel, and the
Greens can make a successful argument for
disregarding the corporate form and sharing
religious beliefs. But courts require evidence
to disregard the corporate form, and the
plaintiffs have presented none. Yet they
filed their suit and immediately asked the
district court to relieve the corporations of

their legal obligations to their employees
under the Regulation, even when we have
repeatedly said that “a preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary remedy, and
thus the right to relief must be clear and
unequivocal.”
C. Judicial Restraint
Although I conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in denying the
corporate plaintiffs' RFRA claim, I do not
think we need to decide as a final matter
whether for-profit, secular corporations have
RFRA or Free Exercise Clause rights. The
corporate plaintiffs' failure to meet their
burden of showing they are substantially
likely to succeed on the merits is a sufficient
basis to affirm the district court's order…
II. THE GREENS' RFRA CLAIM
Unlike Hobby Lobby and Mardel, the
Greens do not have to convince us that they
have RFRA rights. It is clear they do. The
obstacle they must overcome is whether they
can claim that the Regulation violates their
RFRA rights even though the Regulation
applies to the corporate plaintiffs.
I would hold that the Greens have standing
to pursue their RFRA claim because they
have shown the Regulation injures them in a
direct, personal way. I would then remand to
the district court with instructions to
reconsider their request for a preliminary
injunction in light of a proper understanding
of the Greens' claim that the Regulation
substantially burdens their religious beliefs.
…
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III. FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE CLAIM
The district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying a preliminary injunction for the
plaintiffs' Free Exercise claim because they
have not clearly and unequivocally shown
that they are substantially likely to succeed
on the merits….
CONCLUSION
I would (1) affirm the district court's denial
of a preliminary injunction for Hobby Lobby

and Mardel on their RFRA claim; (2)
conclude that the Greens have standing to
assert their RFRA and Free Exercise claims;
(3) reverse the district court's holding that
the Greens' RFRA claim is not substantially
likely to succeed and remand for
reconsideration; and (4) affirm the district
court's denial of a preliminary injunction on
the plaintiffs' Free Exercise Clause claim.
Finally, I concur that the Anti–Injunction
Act does not apply to this case.
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“Contraceptive Mandate Divides Appeals Courts”
The Washington Post
Robert Barnes
July 26, 2013
A federal appeals court ruling on Friday
increased the chances that the Supreme
Court in its coming term will need to settle
whether secular, for-profit corporations must
provide
contraceptive
coverage
to
employees despite the owners’ religious
objections.
A divided panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 3rd Circuit ruled that a
Pennsylvania cabinet-making company
owned by a Mennonite family must comply
with the contraceptive mandate contained in
the Affordable Care Act.
The majority said it “respectfully disagrees”
with judges in the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the 10th Circuit in Denver, who recently
narrowly found just the opposite. A split in
interpreting federal statutes is usually an
invitation for the Supreme Court to resolve
the issue.
This one is novel: The justices have never
said whether a secular corporation is
protected by the Constitution or federal
statute from complying with a law because
of religious objections from its owners.
The 3rd Circuit majority noted that the court
has numerous times — most recently in
Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission — found that corporations have
free speech rights. But it said there was a
“total absence of caselaw” to support the

argument that corporations are protected by
the Constitution’s guarantee of free exercise
of religion.
“Even if we were to disregard the lack of
historical recognition of the right, we simply
cannot understand how a for-profit, secular
corporation — apart from its owners — can
exercise religion,” wrote Circuit Judge
Robert E. Cowen, who was joined by Circuit
Judge Thomas I. Vanaskie.
Cowen said it did not seem plausible that an
entity “created to make money could
exercise such an inherently ‘human’ right.”
Circuit Judge Kent A. Jordan said in a
dissent twice as long as the majority opinion
that if there is a lack of case law establishing
a corporation’s religious rights, “that is in all
probability because there has never before
been a government policy that could be
perceived as intruding on religious liberty as
aggressively as the mandate.”
The mandate requires companies with 50 or
more employees to provide insurance that
covers federally approved birth control
measures. Conestoga Wood Specialties
Company, which has 950 employees, is
owned by the Hahn family, who say their
Mennonite religion teaches that life begins
at conception. They particularly object to
having to cover the “morning-after” and
“week-after” pills.
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The lawsuit is among more than 60 filed
across the country objecting to the
contraceptive mandate. Some are filed by
companies such as Conestoga and others by
nonprofit groups and organizations with
religious connections.
In a decision by the entire 10th Circuit, the
closely divided judges ruled that the chain
store Hobby Lobby was likely protected by
the Constitution and the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act from having to provide
contraceptive coverage that violated the

owners’ religious beliefs.
“It looks like we’re heading for a Supreme
Court review,” said Kyle Duncan, general
counsel of the Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, which is active in opposing the
contraceptive mandate.
Marcia Greenberger of the National
Women’s Law Center, which supports the
law, agreed, and noted that other appeals
courts will likely soon be deciding other
cases on the issue.
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“ObamaCare Birth Control Mandate on Fast Track to Supreme Court”
The Hill
Sam Baker
August 22, 2013
ObamaCare's birth control mandate is
putting the president's signature legislative
issue on a fast track back to the Supreme
Court.
Lawyers on both sides of the issue say the
high court will almost certainly have to rule
on the controversial policy, possibly as early
as its next term.
Two federal appeals courts have come down
with opposite rulings on an important
question related to the policy: whether forprofit businesses and their owners have the
right to challenge in court the requirement
that businesses provide contraception as part
of their insurance coverage.
“I think it’s likely the Supreme Court is
going to end up deciding this thing, and the
question is when,” said Mark Rienzi, senior
counsel at the Becket Fund for Religious
Liberty, which has organized many of the
60-plus
lawsuits
challenging
the
contraception mandate.
The different rulings by the two federal
appeals courts significantly increase the
likelihood the mandate will end up with the
Supreme Court, possibly with a ruling just
two years after the justices ruled
ObamaCare’s insurance mandate was
constitutional.
Louise Melling, deputy legal director at the
American Civil Liberties Union, which
supports the contraception mandate, said it’s

“likely” the Supreme Court could hear oral
arguments in its next term, depending on the
timing of appeals.
“I would anticipate, when there’s this much
activity … that the court will hear one of
these,” Melling said.
Last month, a panel of judges on the 3rd
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against the
owners of a for-profit corporation who sued
to block the mandate.
Members of the Hahn family, which owns a
cabinet-making firm called Conestoga, said
complying
with
the
contraception
requirement would violate their Mennonite
faith.
But the 3rd Circuit said the family could not
sue over a policy that applies to its
company.
“Since Conestoga is distinct from the Hahns,
the Mandate does not actually require the
Hahns to do anything,” the court said. “All
responsibility for complying with the
Mandate falls on Conestoga.”
The owners’ religious beliefs do not “pass
through” to the corporation they own, the
court said in its ruling.
“The Hahn family chose to incorporate and
conduct business through Conestoga,
thereby obtaining both the advantages and
disadvantages of the corporate form. We
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simply cannot ignore the distinction between
Conestoga and the Hahns,” the court said.

religious mission have also sued, citing the
religious beliefs of their owners.

The ACLU’s Melling said the 3rd Circuit
got it right. The Constitution guarantees
freedom of religion to individuals, she said,
not businesses.

Critics of the mandate won an important
victory in June, when the 10th Circuit Court
of Appeals ruled in June that the owners of
Hobby Lobby, a chain of arts-and-crafts
stores, could sue to block the mandate from
applying to their company.

“Corporations don’t pray and have values,”
Melling said.
Alliance Defending Freedom, the group
representing Conestoga and the Hahns, has
vowed to appeal the ruling to the Supreme
Court. Matt Bowman, the alliance’s legal
director, said the group will file its appeal as
soon as possible.
“We are hopeful that the court will take this
because whether families can exercise
religion in their daily lives is an extremely
important issue, and it can’t be an issue that
has a different answer based on what part of
the country you live in,” Bowman said in an
interview.
ObamaCare’s birth control mandate requires
most employers to include contraception in
their employees’ healthcare plans without
charging a co-pay or deductible.
Churches and houses of worship are
completely exempt. Religious-affiliated
employers, like Catholic schools and
hospitals, don’t have to offer or pay for the
coverage themselves, but their insurance
companies still have to make it available
without cost-sharing.
Most lawsuits against the mandate have
been filed by religious-affiliated institutions,
but some for-profit corporations without a

“Would an incorporated kosher butcher
really have no claim to challenge a
regulation mandating non-kosher butchering
practices?” the 10th Circuit asked. “The
kosher butcher, of course, might directly
serve a religious community … But we see
no reason why one must orient one’s
business toward a religious community to
preserve Free Exercise protections.”
It’s possible the court could simply agree to
hear the Conestoga case, but legal experts
said they’re primarily keeping an eye on the
Hobby Lobby suit.
How quickly the mandate makes it to the
Supreme Court will likely depend on
whether and when the Justice Department
files an appeal in the Hobby Lobby case,
they said.
“I assume they are eager to get this thing
resolved,” the Becket Fund’s Rienzi said.
His organization represents Hobby Lobby.
Justice could forego a quick appeal and let
the issue continue to play out in lower
courts. Neither the 3rd Circuit nor the 10th
Circuit actually ruled on the merits of
whether the contraception policy is
constitutional, and similar lawsuits are still
pending in two more circuits.
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For either case to make it onto the docket in
the court’s next term, Justice would need to
file its appeal by about Sept. 25, legal
observers said.
If the court agrees to hear the case, oral
arguments would likely take place early next
year and a decision would come by next

summer — about two years after the court’s
landmark ruling upholding the law’s central
provisions.
“I’m just assuming that the court is going to
hear one of these cases,” the ACLU’s
Melling said.
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“Hobby Lobby Wins a Stay Against Birth Control Mandate”
Reuters
Jonathan Stempel
July 19, 2013
A federal judge has temporarily exempted
Hobby Lobby Stores Inc from a requirement
in the 2010 healthcare law that it offer
workers insurance coverage for birth
control, which the retailer said violated its
religious beliefs.
The preliminary injunction issued by U.S.
District Judge Joe Heaton in Oklahoma City,
where Hobby Lobby is based, covers the arts
and crafts chain and its affiliated Mardel
Christian bookstore chain.
He put the case on hold until October 1,
giving the federal government time to decide
whether to appeal a June 27 decision by a
federal appeals court in Denver to let Hobby
Lobby challenge the mandate on religious
grounds.
A U.S. Department of Justice spokesman
had no immediate comment. The
government has said contraception coverage
is needed to promote public health and
gender equality.
The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, a
nonprofit law firm representing Hobby
Lobby, said there are 63 lawsuits nationwide
challenging the mandate.
It said Hobby Lobby is the largest company
to be excused, at least temporarily, from
having to comply. Hobby Lobby has 556
stores in 45 U.S. states, and has about
13,000 employees.

The Green family, which owns Hobby
Lobby, had argued that providing coverage
to workers for the morning-after pill and
similar contraceptives violated its Christian
beliefs.
It also said it could have under Obamacare
faced $1.3 million in daily fines by not
providing such coverage.
In a written order, Heaton said the size of
those penalties, the "substantial" public
policy issues involved, and the amount of
similar litigation justified an injunction for
Hobby Lobby.
"There is a substantial public interest in
ensuring that no individual or corporation
has their legs cut out from under them while
these difficult issues are resolved," Heaton
said at a hearing, according to the Becket
Fund.
In its June 27 ruling, the Denver appeals
court said there was a good chance that
Hobby Lobby would ultimately prevail.
It said Hobby Lobby had "drawn a line at
providing coverage for drugs or devices they
consider to induce abortions, and it is not for
us to question whether the line is
reasonable."
Lori Windham, senior counsel for the
Becket Fund, said in an interview that
Heaton's decision "shows that companies
can be protected from the mandate, and
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continue to exercise their religious beliefs in
the way they run their businesses."

The case is Hobby Lobby Stores Inc et al v.
Sebelius et al, U.S. District Court, Western
District of Oklahoma, No. 12-01000.
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“Obama Contraceptive Mandate Upheld by U.S. Appeals Court”
Bloomberg
Tom Schoenberg
July 27, 2013
The Obama administration won an appeals
court victory in a challenge to its 2010
health-care law by a for-profit company
seeking a religious exemption to a mandate
that employers provide insurance coverage
for contraceptives.

Hobby Lobby

In a 2-1 decision, the U.S. Court of Appeals
in Philadelphia yesterday rejected a
challenge to the Affordable Care Act
requirement brought by Conestoga Wood
Specialties Corp., a cabinet maker owned by
Mennonite Christians who argued the
mandate violates their religious beliefs.

Conestoga and other companies challenged
the government over the provision of the
2010 U.S. health law requiring employers
and insurers to provide preventive health
services without charge to their workers, a
category of service the administration said
includes birth control.

“We simply conclude that the law has long
recognized the distinction between the
owners of a corporation and the corporation
itself,” U.S. Circuit Judge Robert Cowen
wrote in the majority decision. “A holding to
the contrary -- that a for-profit corporation
can engage in religious exercise -- would
eviscerate the fundamental principle that a
corporation is a legally distinct entity from
its owners.”

Thirty-six lawsuits have been filed by forprofit companies challenging the Affordable
Care Act’s contraceptive coverage mandate,
according to the National Women’s Law
Center. In at least 24 cases the plaintiffs
have won rulings allowing them not to
provide the coverage while the litigation is
pending. In seven cases, the court has ruled
against the companies’ request, according to
the group.

The ruling sets up a split between federal
appeals courts that makes it more likely the
U.S. Supreme Court will eventually consider
the dispute. On June 27, a federal appeals
court in Denver ruled that Hobby Lobby
Stores Inc. was likely to win on the merits of
its argument that the mandate violates the
rights of the company and its owners under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and
the First Amendment of the Constitution.

A federal judge on July 19 issued a ruling
blocking enforcement of the mandate
against Hobby Lobby and put the case on
hold until October.

“Most courts agree that all Americans have
religious freedom even when trying to earn a
living and we think this decision will
eventually be reviewed and that religious
freedom will be vindicated,” Matt Bowman,
a lawyer for Conestoga at the Washingtonbased Alliance for Defending Freedom, said
in an interview.
‘Grievous Harm’
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In a 66-page dissent, Circuit Judge Kent
Jordan said the majority’s ruling “guarantees
grievous harm” as Conestoga’s owners are
forced to pay for the “offending
contraceptives, including abortifacients,” in
violation of their religious convictions or
face “ruinous fines.”
“It should not be hard for us to join the
many courts across the country that have
looked
at
the
mandate
and
its

implementation and concluded that the
government should be enjoined from telling
sincere believers in the sanctity of life to put
their consciences aside and support other
people’s reproductive choices,” Jordan said.
The case is Conestoga Wood Specialties
Corp. v. Secretary of the Department of
Health and Human Services, 13-1144, U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
(Philadelphia).
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LIBERTY UNIVERSITY, INCORPORATED, a Virginia Nonprofit Corporation; Michele
G. Waddell; Joanne V. Merrill, Plaintiffs–Appellants,
and
Martha A. Neal; David Stein, M.D.; Pausanias Alexander; Mary T. Bendorf; Delegate
Kathy Byron; Jeff Helgeson, Plaintiffs,
v.
Jacob LEW, Secretary of the Treasury of the United States, in his official capacity;
Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of the United States Department of Health and Human
Services, in her official capacity; Seth Harris, Acting Secretary of the United States
Department of Labor, in his official capacity; Eric H. Holder, Jr., Attorney General of the
United States, in his official capacity, Defendants–Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Decided on July 11, 2013
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
MOTZ, DAVIS, and WYNN, Circuit Juges:
Liberty University and certain individuals
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this
action challenging two provisions of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act:
the “individual mandate,” which requires
individuals to purchase a minimum level of
health insurance coverage, and the
“employer mandate,” which requires certain
employers to offer such coverage to their
employees and their dependents. The district
court dismissed the lawsuit, upholding the
constitutionality of both mandates. On
appeal we held that the Anti–Injunction Act
barred us from considering Plaintiffs' claims
and remanded the case to the district court
with instructions to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted
Plaintiffs' petition for certiorari, vacated our
judgment, and remanded for further
consideration in light of National
Federation of Independent Business v.
Sebelius. After careful consideration of that
case, we affirm the judgment of the district
court.

I.
On March 23, 2010, President Obama
signed the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“Affordable Care Act” or “the
Act”) into law. Liberty and two unaffiliated
individuals challenge the individual
mandate, which will become effective in
2014, and the employer mandate, which will
become effective in 2015. Before resolving
the legal questions, we summarize the
requirements of the mandates and the
relevant facts and procedural history of this
case.
A.
1.
With limited exceptions, the individual
mandate imposes a “penalty” on any
taxpayer who is an “applicable individual”
and fails to obtain “minimum essential
coverage.”…
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Any individual who does not qualify for a
listed exemption is an “applicable
individual.” The Act provides two religionbased
exemptions.
The
“[r]eligious
conscience exemption” applies to an
individual who is “a member of a
recognized religious sect or division
thereof,” and “an adherent of established
tenets or teachings of such sect or division
by reason of which he is conscientiously
opposed to acceptance of the benefits of any
[life, disability, old-age, retirement, or
medical] insurance.” ]…
The penalty for failing to obtain minimum
essential coverage is tied to the individual's
income but cannot exceed the cost of “the
national average premium for qualified
health plans” meeting a certain level of
coverage…
2.
If an “applicable large employer” fails to
provide affordable health care coverage to
its full-time employees and their dependents,
the employer mandate may require an
“assessable payment” by the employer. The
Act defines an “applicable large employer”
as an employer who employed an average of
at least fifty full-time employees during the
preceding year.
Such an employer must make an assessable
payment if at least one of its full-time
employees qualifies for “an applicable
premium tax credit or cost-sharing
reduction” to help pay for health care
coverage. An employee is eligible for an
“applicable premium tax credit” or “costsharing reduction” if the employer fails to

offer the employee “affordable” coverage
providing “minimum value” and the
employee's income falls between 100% and
400% of the poverty line.
The amount of the assessable payment that
an employer required to make such a
payment must pay depends on whether the
employer offers “minimum essential
coverage” to its full-time employees and
their dependents. If the employer fails to
offer such coverage, the assessable payment
is calculated by multiplying $2000 by the
number of full-time employees (less thirty),
prorated over the number of months the
employer is liable. If the employer does
offer such coverage, the assessable payment
is calculated by multiplying $3000 by the
number of employees receiving an
applicable premium tax credit or costsharing reduction, prorated on a monthly
basis…
“Minimum essential coverage” includes
coverage under an “eligible employersponsored plan,” other than coverage of only
certain excepted benefits (like limited scope
dental or vision benefits), which does not
qualify. An “eligible employer-sponsored
plan” includes a “group health plan,” which
is a plan established or maintained by an
employer for the purpose of providing
medical care to employees and their
dependents. Thus, employer-provided health
care coverage would seem to qualify as
minimum essential coverage unless that
coverage applies only to excepted benefits.
In effect, then, § 4980H(a) imposes an
assessable payment on an applicable
employer who fails to offer coverage to its
full-time employees and their dependents,
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while § 4980H(b) imposes an assessable
payment on an applicable employer who
provides coverage that does not satisfy the
mandate's affordability criteria.
B.
On March 23, 2010, the day the President
signed the Affordable Care Act into law,
Plaintiffs filed this action against the
Secretary of the Treasury and other officials
(collectively, “the Secretary”). Plaintiffs
sought a declaration that the individual and
employer mandates are invalid and an order
enjoining their enforcement.
1.
In their second amended complaint, the
individual plaintiffs, Michele G. Waddell
and Joanne V. Merrill, assert that they have
“made a personal choice not to purchase
health insurance coverage and [do] not want
to” do so… They also assert that they are
Christians “who have sincerely held
religious beliefs that abortions, except where
necessary to save the life of the pregnant
mother, are murder and morally repugnant”
and that “they should play no part in such
abortions, including no part in facilitating,
subsidizing, easing, funding, or supporting
such abortions since to do so is evil and
morally repugnant complicity.”
Liberty
alleges
that
it
employs
approximately 3900 full-time faculty and
staff, and that it is self-insured and offers
“health savings accounts, private insurance
policies and other health care reimbursement
options to qualified employees.” Liberty
asserts that “depending upon how the federal
government defines ‘minimum essential

coverage’ and the affordability index,” the
University could be found to offer coverage
insufficient “to satisfy the federal definition
of minimum essential coverage or coverage
that is deemed unaffordable ... and therefore
could be subjected to significant penalties”
and “substantial financial hardship.”…
Finally, Liberty asserts that it “is a Christian
educational institution whose employees are
Christians who have sincerely held religious
beliefs that abortions, except where
necessary to save the life of the pregnant
mother, are murder and morally repugnant.”
It further explains that its religious beliefs
bar it from “play[ing][any] part in abortions,
including [any] part in facilitating,
subsidizing, easing, funding, or supporting
abortions since to do so is evil and morally
repugnant complicity.”
2.
Before the district court, Plaintiffs asserted
that the individual and employer mandates
exceeded Congress's Article I powers and
violated the Tenth Amendment, the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of
the First Amendment, the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, the Fifth
Amendment, the right to free speech and
free association under the First Amendment,
the Article I, Section 9 prohibition against
unapportioned capitation or direct taxes, and
the Guarantee Clause. The Secretary moved
to dismiss the second amended complaint
for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that
Plaintiffs lacked standing and that the Anti–
Injunction Act barred the suit. Alternatively,
the Secretary moved to dismiss all counts
for failure to state a claim upon which relief
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could be granted. The district court
concluded that it possessed jurisdiction but
granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs appealed
only as to the Article I, Establishment
Clause, Free Exercise Clause, Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, and Fifth
Amendment claims.
When we considered the case on appeal, we
did not reach the merits of those claims
because we concluded that the Anti–
Injunction Act deprived us of jurisdiction…
On remand, we must decide whether the
Anti–Injunction Act bars this preenforcement challenge to the employer
mandate, and whether Plaintiffs have
standing to challenge the mandates. If
neither jurisdictional hurdle prevents our
consideration of the merits of the case, we
must determine whether Congress acted
within the scope of its constitutionally
delegated powers when it enacted the
employer mandate. Finally, if we find that
the mandates are a valid exercise of
Congress's Article I powers, we must
address Plaintiffs' religion-based arguments.
Our review is de novo.
II.
The Anti–Injunction Act (“AIA”) provides
that “no suit for the purpose of restraining
the assessment or collection of any tax shall
be maintained in any court by any person.”
Where it applies, the AIA thus deprives
courts of jurisdiction to entertain preenforcement suits seeking to enjoin the
collection of federal taxes.

Liberty's challenge to the employer mandate
is a pre-enforcement suit to enjoin the
collection of an exaction that is codified in
the Internal Revenue Code, and which the
Secretary of the Treasury is empowered to
collect in the same manner as a tax. In
NFIB, however, the Supreme Court made
clear that […] the AIA applies only where
Congress intends it to.
When concluding that Congress did not
intend to bar pre-enforcement challenges to
the individual mandate, the Court in NFIB
found it most significant that Congress
chose to describe the shared responsibility
payment as a “penalty” rather than a “tax.”
Thus, we begin our AIA inquiry with
particular attention to how Congress
characterized the exaction set forth in the
employer mandate.
In maintaining that the AIA bars this
challenge to the employer mandate, the
Secretary relies heavily on the fact that the
Act twice refers to the employer mandate
exaction as a “tax.” In doing so, the
Secretary virtually ignores the fact that the
Act does not consistently characterize the
exaction as a tax. Rather, the Act initially
identifies the employer mandate exaction as
an “assessable payment.” The Act then
proceeds to characterize the exaction as an
“assessable payment” six more times…
Because Congress initially and primarily
refers to the exaction as an “assessable
payment” and not a “tax,” the statutory text
suggests that Congress did not intend the
exaction to be treated as a tax for purposes
of the AIA.
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Furthermore, Congress did not otherwise
indicate that the employer mandate exaction
qualifies as a tax for AIA purposes, though
of course it could have done so…
Finally, we note that to adopt the Secretary's
position would lead to an anomalous result.
The Supreme Court has expressly held that a
person subject to the individual mandate can
bring a pre-enforcement suit challenging
that provision. But, under the Secretary's
theory, an employer subject to the employer
mandate could bring only a postenforcement suit challenging that provision.
It seems highly unlikely that Congress
meant to signal—with two isolated
references to the term “tax”—that the
mandates should be treated differently for
purposes of the AIA's applicability.
Tellingly, the Government has pointed to no
rationale supporting such differential
treatment.
For these reasons, we hold that the employer
mandate exaction, like the individual
mandate exaction, does not constitute a tax
for purposes of the AIA. Therefore, the AIA
does not bar this suit.
III.
The Secretary argues that another
jurisdictional hurdle—standing—prevents
our consideration of the merits of this case.
To establish standing at the motion to
dismiss stage, a plaintiff must plausibly
allege that: “(1) it has suffered an injury in
fact that is (a) concrete and particularized
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural
or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the

defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.” The
Secretary contends that all plaintiffs lack
standing because they allege no actual or
imminent injury. We address first Liberty's
standing and then that of the individual
plaintiffs.
A.
Liberty has more than fifty full-time
employees, and the Secretary does not
contest that it is an “applicable large
employer” subject to the employer
mandate... [T]he Secretary contends that the
health care coverage Liberty acknowledges
it already provides to its employees qualifies
as minimum essential coverage that may
also satisfy the employer mandate's
affordability criteria.
The Secretary's argument may well be
correct—as far as it goes. But Liberty need
not show that it will be subject to an
assessable payment to establish standing if it
otherwise alleges facts that establish
standing. In this case, in addition to alleging
that it “could” be subject to an assessable
payment, Liberty alleges that the employer
mandate and its “attendant burdensome
regulations will ... increase the cost of care”
and “directly and negatively affect [it] by
increasing the cost of providing health
insurance coverage.”…
[T]o establish standing, Liberty need not
prove that the employer mandate will
increase its costs of providing health
coverage; it need only plausibly allege that it
will.
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Liberty's allegation to this effect is plausible.
Even if the coverage Liberty currently
provides ultimately proves sufficient, it may
well incur additional costs because of the
administrative
burden
of
assuring
compliance with the employer mandate, or
due to an increase in the cost of care.

must make preparations to obtain insurance
before the mandate goes into effect.

Moreover, Liberty's injury is imminent even
though the employer mandate will not go
into effect until January 1, 2015, as Liberty
must take measures to ensure compliance in
advance of that date. Thus, Liberty has
standing to challenge the employer mandate.

IV.
A.

B.
The individual plaintiffs, after alleging that
they do not have or want to purchase health
insurance coverage, assert that the individual
mandate “will create a financial hardship in
that [they] will have to either pay for health
insurance coverage ... or face significant
penalties.”
The Secretary maintains that the individual
plaintiffs lack standing because they may be
exempt from the individual mandate penalty,
either because their income is below the
mandate's threshold level or because they
qualify for a proposed hardship exemption.
But, again, at this early stage, plaintiffs need
only provide “general factual allegations of
injury.”
The individual plaintiffs allege the
individual mandate will obligate them to buy
insurance or pay a penalty, and their alleged
lack of insurance provides sufficient support
for that allegation at this stage of the
proceedings. Further, the individual
plaintiffs' injury is imminent because they

Thus, we conclude that the individual
plaintiffs have standing to challenge the
individual mandate. We therefore proceed to
the merits.

Liberty argues that the employer mandate
exceeds Congress's commerce power
because Congress does not have “the power
to order employers to provide governmentdefined
health
insurance
to
their
employees.” This is so, Liberty contends,
because the employer mandate “compel[s]
employers to engage in particular conduct or
purchase an unwanted product,” contrary to
the dictates of NFIB…
The Secretary counters that the employer
mandate is a valid exercise of Congress's
authority under the Commerce Clause
because “[h]ealth coverage benefits form
part of an employee's compensation
package, and ‘it is well-established in
Supreme Court precedent that Congress has
the power to regulate the terms and
conditions of employment.” ’..
[The Secretary argues that] “[t]he provision
of health coverage substantially affects
commerce just as other forms of
compensation and terms of employment do,
and the businesses run by large employers
likewise substantially affect commerce.” We
think the Secretary has the better argument.
B.
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“[T]he determinative test of the exercise of
power by the Congress under the Commerce
Clause is simply whether the activity sought
to be regulated is commerce which concerns
more States than one and has a real and
substantial relation to the national interest .”
“The power of Congress in this field is
broad and sweeping ....“ “[T]he power to
regulate commerce is the power to enact all
appropriate legislation for its protection or
advancement; to adopt measures to promote
its growth and insure its safety; to foster,
protect, control, and restrain.”…
To be sure, Congress's authority under the
Commerce Clause is not without limits…
Although “[t]here has been considerable
debate about whether the statements [in
NFIB ] about the Commerce Clause are
dicta or binding precedent,” these five
justices agreed that the Commerce Clause
does not grant Congress the authority to
“compel” or “mandate” an individual to
enter commerce by purchasing a good or
service. Rather, these justices concluded that
the Commerce Clause permits Congress to
regulate only existing activity.
Chief Justice Roberts's—and, to a large
degree, the joint dissenters'—analysis
focused on the text of the Commerce Clause,
the Court's cases interpreting that clause,
and the practical effect and operation of the
individual mandate. As to the text, Chief
Justice Roberts noted that the Commerce
Clause “grants Congress the power to
‘regulate Commerce.’”…
As to the Court's prior cases, the Chief
Justice noted that “all have one thing in
common: They uniformly describe the

power as reaching ‘activity.’ “The joint
dissenters similarly distinguished the
Commerce Clause cases on which the
government
relied
as
“involv[ing]
commercial
activity,”
and
“not
represent[ing] the expansion of the federal
power to direct into a broad new field,”
Finally, both Chief Justice Roberts and the
joint dissenters expressed substantial
concern about the practical and operational
effects of the individual mandate. Chief
Justice Roberts suggested that construing the
commerce power to allow Congress to
mandate the purchase of health insurance
would “permit Congress to regulate
individuals precisely because they are doing
nothing,” and “would bring countless
decisions an individual could potentially
make within the scope of federal regulation
....”
C.
For the reasons set forth within, we find that
the employer mandate is no monster; rather,
it is simply another example of Congress's
longstanding authority to regulate employee
compensation offered and paid for by
employers in interstate commerce. To begin,
we note that unlike the individual mandate
(as construed by five justices in NFIB ), the
employer mandate does not seek to create
commerce in order to regulate it. In contrast
to individuals, all employers are, by their
very nature, engaged in economic activity.
All employers are in the market for labor.
And to the extent that the employer mandate
compels employers in interstate commerce
to do something, it does not compel them to
“become active in commerce.” Liberty fails
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to recognize the distinction between
individuals not otherwise engaged in
commerce and employers necessarily so
engaged…
Having found that the provision regulates
existing economic activity (employee
compensation), and therefore stands on quite
a different footing from the individual
mandate, we further conclude that the
employer mandate is a valid exercise of
Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause. It has long been settled that
Congress may impose conditions on terms
of employment that substantially affect
interstate commerce. Here, Congress did
both.
First, the employer mandate regulates a term
of employment (compensation) that
substantially affects interstate commerce…
“[E]mployers who do not offer health
insurance to their workers gain an unfair
economic advantage relative to those
employers who do provide coverage,” and
perpetuate a “vicious cycle,”: “uninsured
workers turn to emergency rooms for health
care” they cannot afford; “health care
providers pass on the cost [of the
uncompensated care] to private insurers;”
and insurers “pass on the cost to families”
through premium increases, making it more
expensive—and thus, more difficult—for
employers to insure their employees…
Second, the employer mandate regulates an
activity (employee compensation) that
substantially affects workers' interstate
mobility. The availability and breadth of
employer-sponsored health coverage varies,

and “[t]he availability of health insurance
options can affect people's incentives to
enter the labor force, work fewer or more
hours, retire, change jobs, or even prefer
certain types of firms or jobs.”… Thus,
health insurance provided as part of
employee compensation substantially affects
interstate mobility, and thereby interstate
commerce.
Our recognition of Congress's authority to
enact the employer mandate does not “open
a new and potentially vast domain to
congressional authority,” or “enable the
Federal Government to regulate all private
conduct.” Requiring employers to offer their
employees a certain level of compensation
through health insurance coverage is akin to
requiring employers to pay their workers a
minimum wage, or “time and a half for
overtime.” Thus, our conclusion fits
squarely within the existing core of the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence, including
the admonition of five justices in NFIB that
Congress may not, through its commerce
power, seek to create commerce in order to
regulate it.
D.
For all these reasons, we conclude that
Congress had a rational basis for finding that
employers' provision of health insurance
coverage substantially affects interstate
commerce, and Congress's regulation of this
activity does not run afoul of NFIB's
teachings. Accordingly, we hold that the
employer mandate is a valid exercise of
Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause.
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V.
A.

punishment
omission.”

Plaintiffs contend that “[t]he Taxing and
Spending or General Welfare Clause does
not vest Congress with the authority to enact
the [individual and employer] mandates.”
But in NFIB, the Supreme Court held that
the individual mandate exaction constituted
a tax and that Congress acted well within the
scope of its constitutionally granted
authority in imposing it. Clearly, then,
Plaintiffs' contention fails with regard to the
individual mandate. And although NFIB did
not present the Supreme Court with an
opportunity to address the constitutionality
of the employer mandate, we are convinced
that the NFIB taxing power analysis
inevitably leads to the conclusion that the
employer mandate exaction, too, is a
constitutional tax.

C.

B.
…The Supreme Court has defined a tax as a
“pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or
property for the purpose of supporting the
government,” and described Congress's
taxing power as “very extensive.”
In NFIB, the Supreme Court gleaned from
precedent a “functional approach” for
determining whether an exaction, whatever
Congress calls it, constitutes a tax. Under
that approach, the “essential feature” of any
tax is that “it produces at least some revenue
for the Government.”…
The Court did [] attempt to distinguish taxes
from penalties, explaining that “if the
concept of penalty means anything, it means

for

an

unlawful

act

or

First, we examine the factors the Supreme
Court considered in upholding the individual
mandate exaction as a constitutional tax. In
applying its “functional approach” to that
exaction, the Supreme Court concluded that
it “looks like a tax in many respects.” First
and foremost, it will produce “at least some
revenue for the Government”—namely
“about $4 billion per year by 2017.” Further
attributes that convinced the Supreme Court
that the individual mandate exaction
constitutes a tax include: its “pa [yment] into
the Treasury by taxpayers when they file
their tax returns”; the fact that “its amount is
determined by such familiar factors as
taxable income, number of dependents, and
joint filing status”; and its inclusion “in the
Internal Revenue Code and enforce[ment]
by the IRS, which ... must assess and collect
it in the same manner as taxes.” The
Supreme Court also distinguished the
individual mandate tax from an exaction the
Court invalidated as an impermissible
penalty in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.
The Court noted that the individual mandate,
unlike the provision at issue in Drexel,
contains no scienter requirement and does
not constitute “prohibitory financial
punishment.”…
Finally, the Supreme Court swiftly dispelled
any notion that the individual mandate
constituted a direct tax subject to the
constitutional apportionment requirement.
Having recognized only two types of direct
taxes—those on individuals as individuals
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and those on property—the Supreme Court
held that the individual mandate payment
fits into neither category.
At the end of the day, the Supreme Court
concluded that when an exaction “need not
be read to do more than impose a tax[,]”
“[t]hat is sufficient to sustain it.” The Court
held that because the Affordable Care Act's
individual mandate could be read simply as
imposing a tax, Congress had the power to
enact it. The Supreme Court thus squarely
rejected Plaintiffs' contention that the
individual mandate exaction is not a
constitutional tax.
D.
Turning now to the employer mandate, it is
clear from the provision's face that it
possesses the “essential feature” of any tax:
“it produces at least some revenue for the
Government.” Indeed, the Congressional
Budget Office estimated that the employer
mandate exaction will generate $11 billion
annually by 2019.
Looking beyond the “essential feature” to
other “functional” characteristics, the
exaction the Affordable Care Act imposes
on large employers “looks like a tax in many
respects.” The exaction is paid into the
Treasury, “found in the Internal Revenue
Code[,] and enforced by the IRS,” which
“must assess and collect it in the same
manner as” a tax. Further, the employer
mandate lacks a scienter requirement, does
not punish unlawful conduct, and leaves
large employers with a choice for complying
with the law—provide adequate, affordable
health coverage to employees or pay a tax.

And finally, because the exaction taxes
neither individuals as such nor property, it is
not a direct tax subject to the apportionment
requirement.
Relying exclusively on Drexel, Liberty
contends that the employer mandate
exaction nevertheless “cross[es] the line”
from a reasonable payment to a “potentially
destructive” unconstitutional penalty. Fatally
for Liberty's argument, Drexel is easily
distinguishable from the case at hand.
In Drexel, the Supreme Court invalidated a
“so-called tax on employing child laborers”
as an impermissible penalty. The Supreme
Court did so ostensibly because the penalty:
(1) carried a scienter requirement “typical of
punitive statutes, because Congress often
wishes to punish only those who
intentionally break the law”; (2) imposed an
“exceedingly heavy” financial burden—10
percent of an offender's net income—even if
the offender employed only one child
laborer for only one day of the year; and (3)
was enforced at least in part by the
Department of Labor, an agency responsible
not for collecting revenue but rather for
punishing labor law violations. In stark
contrast to the penalty the Court struck
down in Drexel, the employer mandate
exaction is devoid of any scienter
requirement and does not punish unlawful
behavior. Further, the exaction is collected
by the Secretary of the Treasury in the same
manner as a tax…
We therefore reject Liberty's argument that
the employer mandate imposes a penalty
rather than a tax.
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E.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court has
already upheld the individual mandate
exaction as a constitutional tax. Similarly,
the employer mandate exaction “need not be
read to do more than impose a tax.”
Accordingly, Congress had the power to
enact it, and we must uphold it. For these
reasons, as well as those provided supra in
Part IV, we reject Plaintiffs' contention that
Congress lacked authority under Article I of
the Constitution to enact the employer
mandate.
VI.
Finally, Plaintiffs challenge the Act on
various religion-based grounds. In their
second amended complaint, Plaintiffs allege
that the Act violates their rights under the
First and Fifth Amendments and the
Religious
Freedom
Restoration
Act
(“RFRA”). For the first time on this appeal,
they also seek to challenge on religious
grounds certain regulations implementing
the Act. We initially consider the claims
alleged in the second amended complaint
and then those raised for the first time on
this appeal.
A.
1.
Plaintiffs maintain that both the employer
mandate and the individual mandate violate
their free exercise rights under the First
Amendment and RFRA. Specifically, they
allege that the mandates unlawfully force
them to violate their religious belief that
“they should play ... no part in facilitating,

subsidizing, easing, funding, or supporting
... abortions.”
The Free Exercise Clause provides that
“Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting
the free exercise” of religion. However, the
Clause does not compel Congress to exempt
religious practices from a “valid and neutral
law of general applicability.”…
A neutral law of general applicability thus
does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.
The Act is just such a law. It has no object
that “infringe[s] upon or restrict[s] practices
because of their religious motivation,” and
imposes no “burden[ ] only on conduct
motivated by religious belief.”…
[B]y its own terms, RFRA directs
application of strict scrutiny only if the
Government
“substantially
burden[s]”
religious practice. A substantial burden, in
turn, requires “substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to
violate his beliefs.”
Plaintiffs present no plausible claim that the
Act substantially burdens their free exercise
of religion, by forcing them to facilitate or
support abortion or otherwise. The Act
specifically provides individuals the option
to purchase a plan that covers no abortion
services except those for cases of rape or
incest, or where the life of the mother would
be endangered… Furthermore, the Act
allows an individual to obtain, and an
employer to offer, a plan that covers no
abortion services at all, not even excepted
services.
Given that the mandates themselves impose
no substantial burden, the option of paying a
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tax to avoid the mandates' requirements
certainly imposes no substantial burden. On
the contrary, this option underscores the
“lawful choice” Plaintiffs have to avoid any
coverage they might consider objectionable.

The Lemon test requires “a secular
legislative purpose,” a “principal or primary
effect ... that neither advances nor inhibits
religion,” and no “excessive government
entanglement with religion.”

To the extent Plaintiffs contend that the tax
payment itself is a substantial burden, as the
district court explained, the Act “contains
strict safeguards at multiple levels to prevent
federal funds from being used to pay for
[non-excepted] abortion services.”…

The first exemption Plaintiffs challenge is
the
individual
mandate's
religious
conscience exemption. Plaintiffs maintain
that this exemption discriminates against
their religious practice by applying only to
sects that conscientiously oppose all
insurance benefits, provide for their own
members, and were established before
December 31, 1950. The religious
conscience exemption adopts an exemption
of the Social Security Amendments of 1965
under 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g), which courts
have consistently found constitutional under
the Establishment Clause and the Fifth
Amendment. As the Supreme Court
explained with respect to the § 1402(g)
exemption, “Congress granted an exemption
... [to] a narrow category which was readily
identifiable,” i.e., “persons in a religious
community having its own ‘welfare’
system.”…

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' free exercise
claims—both under the Constitution and
under RFRA—fail.
2.
Plaintiffs also allege that the two religious
exemptions in the Act violate the
Establishment Clause and their Fifth
Amendment equal protection rights. Of
course, the mere existence of religious
exemptions in a statute poses no
constitutional
problem.
Rather,
the
Constitution freely permits exemptions that
will allow “religious exercise to exist
without
sponsorship
and
without
interference.” Permissible benevolence
morphs into impermissible sponsorship only
when the “proposed accommodation singles
out a particular religious sect for special
treatment.” Thus, a court applies strict
scrutiny only to statutes that “make [ ]
explicit and deliberate distinctions between
different religious organizations.”
A statute without such distinctions, even one
that has a disparate impact on different
denominations, need only satisfy the less
rigorous test set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman.

The exemption passes the Lemon test
because it has a secular purpose: “to ensure
that all persons are provided for, either by
the [Act's insurance] system or by their
church.” The exemption's principal effects
also neither advance nor inhibit religion, but
only assure that all individuals are covered,
one way or the other…
The second individual mandate exemption
challenged by Plaintiffs is the health care
sharing ministry exemption. Plaintiffs
maintain that it unconstitutionally selects an
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arbitrary formation date of December 31,
1999 as the eligibility cutoff. But even if the
exemption's cutoff date is arbitrary, it is not
unconstitutional. For neither the cutoff's text
nor its history suggests any deliberate
attempt to distinguish between particular
religious groups. Accordingly, the cutoff
need only satisfy the Lemon test.
Applying Lemon, the date serves at least two
“secular legislative purpose[s].” First, the
cutoff ensures that the ministries provide
care that possesses the reliability that comes
with historical practice. Second, it
accommodates religious health care without
opening the floodgates for any group to
establish a new ministry to circumvent the
Act. The “primary effect” of the cutoff
accordingly “neither advances nor inhibits
religion.” Further, given that it applies only
secular criteria, the cutoff does not “foster
an excessive government entanglement with
religion.”
Plaintiffs additionally contend that both the
religious conscience exemption and the
health care sharing ministry exemption
violate their Fifth Amendment equal
protection rights. In furtherance of this
argument they maintain that both
exemptions are subject to the heightened
scrutiny that applies “if the plaintiff can
show the basis for the distinction was
religious ... in nature.” Here, the distinction
made between sects that oppose insurance
and provide for themselves in their own
welfare system and those that do not, and
the distinction made between ministries
formed before 1999 and those formed after,
are secular and thus subject only to rational
basis review. Both distinctions are rationally

related to the Government's legitimate
interest in accommodating religious practice
while limiting interference in the Act's
overriding purposes.
We therefore conclude that Plaintiffs have
failed to state any plausible claim that the
Establishment Clause or the Fifth
Amendment provide a basis for relief.
B.
In their recent post-remand briefs, Plaintiffs
argue at length that certain regulations
implementing neither the individual nor the
employer mandate but another portion of the
Act- § 1001 violate their religious rights.
These new regulations require group health
plans to cover all FDA-approved
contraceptive methods.
Plaintiffs' second amended complaint
mentions neither § 1001 of the Affordable
Care Act nor 42 U.S.C. § 300gg–13.
Further, the complaint does not mention
contraception. To be sure, the complaint
specifies that Plaintiffs have “sincerely held
religious beliefs that abortions ... are murder
and ... they should play ... no part in
facilitating, subsidizing, easing, funding, or
supporting ... abortions.” But the complaint
gives no notice that Plaintiffs challenge
methods of contraception or include within
their challenge to “abortion” all the forms of
contraception
they
now
label
“abortifacients.”
Moreover, Plaintiffs did not challenge these
regulations, or make any argument related to
contraception or abortifacients, in the district
court, in their first appeal before us, or in
their Supreme Court briefs. The Supreme
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Court in turn ordered a limited remand […]
which did not discuss this issue.
Nevertheless, for the first time in their postremand briefs, Plaintiffs seek to challenge
these regulations. Generally, “a federal
appellate court does not consider an issue
not passed upon below.”
Of course, in our discretion, we can make
“[e]xceptions to this general rule” but we do
so “only in very limited circumstances.” The
Supreme Court has explained that we are
“justified” in making such an exception
when the “proper resolution is beyond any
doubt” or “injustice might otherwise result.”
We have also recognized that certain other
“limited circumstances” may justify such
action, e.g., when refusal to do so would
constitute plain error or result in a
fundamental miscarriage of justice, or where
there is an intervening change in the case
law.

Plaintiffs do not contend that any of these
“limited circumstances” apply here. There is
good reason for this; none does…
Finding no circumstance justifying a
premature resolution of Plaintiffs' new
arguments and compelling reasons for
refusing to do so in this case, we decline to
reach Plaintiffs' challenge to the new
regulations.
VII.
In sum, in light of the Supreme Court's
teachings in NFIB, we hold that we have
jurisdiction to decide this case. On the
merits, we affirm the judgment of the district
court dismissing the complaint in its entirety
for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted.
AFFIRMED
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“Court Rejects Obamacare Challenge by Christian College”
Reuters
Jonathan Stempel
July 11, 2013
A U.S. appeals court on Thursday rejected a
Christian university's challenge to President
Barack Obama's 2010 healthcare overhaul,
which the school said unconstitutionally
imposes costly burdens on large employers
and infringes religious liberty.
The 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in
Richmond, Virginia, rejected Liberty
University's argument that the law violated
the constitution's Commerce Clause by
forcing large employers to provide health
insurance to full-time workers and violated
First Amendment religious protections by
subsidizing abortions.
The 3-0 panel decision addressed issues that
the U.S. Supreme Court did not take up in
June 2012, when by a 5-4 vote it upheld
most of the healthcare law known as
"Obamacare."
In that case, the court upheld the individual
mandate requiring people to buy insurance
or pay a tax. It said the mandate was a valid
exercise of Congress' taxing power, though
it exceeded Congress' power under the
Commerce Clause.
Mathew Staver, the dean of Liberty's law
school, said in a phone interview that the
university plans to appeal the decision to the
Supreme Court this month.
"It goes against the principle that the
Supreme Court laid down that Congress
cannot force individuals to buy an unwanted

product," he said. "We believe the same
principle applies to employers. If we win on
the employer mandate, then the mandate
would be gone for religious and nonreligious employers."
The U.S. Department of Justice, which
defended the law at the 4th Circuit, was not
immediately available for comment.
Dozens of groups and individuals supported
either Liberty or the federal government
during the appeals process.
Liberty, based in Lynchburg, Virginia, was
founded by the late U.S. evangelist Jerry
Falwell. It had filed its lawsuit shortly after
Obama signed the healthcare law in 2010.
EMPLOYER MANDATE
"MONSTER"

NOT

A

In its decision, the 4th Circuit said the
employer mandate does not require
employers to buy a product they do not
want, saying that employers are free to and
often do self-insure.
It also said Congress had a rational basis for
the mandate because it substantially affects
how easily workers can move from state to
state. The court also rejected the argument
that the mandate imposes a penalty rather
than a tax.
"The employer mandate is no monster;
rather, it is simply another example of
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Congress's longstanding authority to
regulate employee compensation offered and
paid for by employers in interstate
commerce," the panel said.

The 4th Circuit had in 2011 dismissed
Liberty's case, saying it lacked jurisdiction,
but was ordered by the Supreme Court to
revisit the matter.

In finding that the law did not violate the
right to freely exercise religion, the 4th
Circuit said the law let individuals and
employers use plans that do not cover
abortion services except in cases of rape or
incest or to protect a mother's life.

Before the Supreme Court sent the case
back, the Obama administration said
Liberty's lawsuit lacked merit, but that it had
no objection to letting the appeals court
consider it.

Circuit Judges Diana Gribbon Motz, Andre
Davis and James Wynn, all appointed by
Democratic presidents, co-wrote the
decision. Most federal appeals court
decisions are written by one judge or are
unsigned.
"It is unusual," Staver said. "I think there
was tension among the panel in terms of the
direction it wanted to go, and it needed a
joint decision to get a consensus."

Obamacare has spawned many other
lawsuits. More than 60 oppose a
requirement that employers provide birth
control coverage, according to the Becket
Fund for Religious Liberty, a nonprofit law
firm.
The case is Liberty University Inc et al v.
Lew et al, 4th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals,
No. 10-2347.
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“Fourth Circuit’s Liberty Ruling Deals a Hidden Blow to Obamacare”
Cato Institute
Michael F. Cannon
July 12, 2013
Obamacare had a rough day in court
yesterday. In Liberty University v. Lew, the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
ruled against Liberty University’s challenge
to various aspects of the law. One might
think, as SCOTUSblog reported, this was a
victory for the Obama administration.
In the process, however, the Fourth Circuit
undercut three arguments the administration
hopes will derail two lawsuits that pose an
even greater threat to Obamacare’s survival,
Pruitt v. Sebelius and Halbig v. Sebelius.
The plaintiffs in both Pruitt and Halbig
claim, correctly, that Obamacare forbids the
administration to issue the law’s “premium
assistance tax credits” in the 34 states that
have refused to establish a health insurance
“exchange.” The Pruitt and Halbig plaintiffs
further claim that the administration’s plans
to issue those tax credits in those 34 states
anyway, contrary to the statute, injures them
in a number of ways. One of those injuries is
that the illegal tax credits would subject the
employer-plaintiffs to penalties under
Obamacare’s employer mandate, from
which they should be exempt. (The event
that triggers penalties against an employer is
when one of its workers receives a tax
credit. If there are no tax credits, there can
be no penalties. Therefore, under the statute,
when those 34 states opted not to establish
exchanges, they effectively exempted their
employers from those penalties.)

The Obama administration has moved to
dismiss Pruitt and Halbig on a number of
grounds. First, it argues that those penalties
are a tax, and the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA)
prevents taxpayers from challenging the
imposition of a tax before it is assessed.
Second, the administration argues that the
injuries claimed by the employer-plaintiffs
are too speculative to establish standing.
Third, shortly after announcing it would
effectively repeal the employer penalties
until 2015, the administration wrote the
Liberty, Pruitt, and Halbig courts to argue
that the delay should (at the very least) delay
the courts’ consideration of those cases. In
Liberty, the Fourth Circuit rejected all of
those claims.
In discussing whether the “assessible
payment” that the employer mandate
imposes on non-compliant employers falls
under the AIA, the court writes:
Because Congress initially and
primarily refers to the exaction as an
“assessable payment” and not a
“tax,” the statutory text suggests that
Congress did not intend the exaction
to be treated as a tax for purposes of
the AIA.
Furthermore, Congress did not
otherwise indicate that the employer
mandate exaction qualifies as a tax
for AIA purposes, though of course
it could have done so. As the
Supreme Court pointed out in NFIB,
26 U.S.C. § 6671(a) provides that the
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“penalties and liabilities” found in
subchapter 68B of the Internal
Revenue Code are “treated as taxes”
for purposes of the AIA. The
employer
mandate,
like
the
individual mandate, is not included
in subchapter 68B, and no other
provision indicates that we are to
treat its “assessable payment” as a
tax.
Finally, we note that to adopt the
Secretary’s position would lead to an
anomalous result. The Supreme
Court has expressly held that a
person subject to the individual
mandate can bring a pre-enforcement
suit challenging that provision. But,
under the Secretary’s theory, an
employer subject to the employer
mandate could bring only a postenforcement suit challenging that
provision. It seems highly unlikely
that Congress meant to signal–with
two isolated references to the term
“tax”–-that the mandates should be
treated differently for purposes of the
AIA’s applicability. Tellingly, the
Government has pointed to no
rationale supporting such differential
treatment.
For these reasons, we hold that the
employer mandate exaction, like the
individual mandate exaction, does
not constitute a tax for purposes of
the AIA. Therefore, the AIA does
not bar this suit.
It is worth mentioning that the Pruitt and
Halbig plaintiffs aren’t even asking the
courts to enjoin the collection of the
penalties. The penalties are merely one of
the injuries they suffer. The relief they seek
is to block the illegal tax credits, without
which no penalty can be assessed. But even

if we pretend (as the government does) that
they are trying to block the collection of a
tax, the federal district courts for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma (Pruitt) and the
District of Columbia (Halbig) may now rely
on the Fourth Circuit’s opinion in Liberty to
reject the argument that the AIA applies to
the employer mandate.
As in Pruitt and Halbig, the administration
also argued that Liberty University could not
challenge the employer mandate because the
university hadn’t proved it would be
assessed a penalty. The court responded:
“[T]o establish standing, Liberty need not
prove that the employer mandate will
increase its costs of providing health
coverage; it need only plausibly allege that it
will.”
Liberty’s allegation to this effect is
plausible. Even if the coverage Liberty
currently provides ultimately proves
sufficient, it may well incur additional costs
because of the administrative burden of
assuring compliance with the employer
mandate, or due to an increase in the cost of
care.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit rejected the
administration’s argument that the delay of
the employer mandate should delay
challenges to the mandate:
Liberty’s injury is imminent even
though the employer mandate will
not go into effect until January 1,
2015, as Liberty must take measures
to ensure compliance in advance of
that date.
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If anything the delay may increase the
likelihood that the Pruitt and Halbig
employer-plaintiffs will establish standing.
In response to the government’s employermandate-delay
argument
in
Pruitt,
Oklahoma’s solicitor general argued that the
delay actually validates the State of
Oklahoma’s claim that it is injured by the
mandate:
The federal government’s decision to
delay implementation
of the
reporting and other regulatory
requirements it seeks to impose on
large employers in Oklahoma
confirms what the State has been
saying all along: those reporting and
other requirements are burdensome,
onerous, and injurious to it and every
other large employer in the state. In
fact, the IRS has justified the delay
by noting that large employers
nationwide are finding it impossible
to understand and comply with the
baffling array of new requirements…

reporting requirements and other
large
employer
mandate
requirements are in fact injuring
large employers such as the State.
So the administration could find that its
employer-mandate delay has the opposite of
the desired effect.
In sum, the administration threw everything
it had at Liberty, but still couldn’t prevent
Liberty University’s challenge to the
employer mandate from reaching the merits.
That’s very good for Pruitt, Halbig, and
taxpayers, but very bad for Obamacare.

The State has argued it has standing
in this case as a result of having to
comply with the very reporting and
other requirements that caused this
delay. Despite having apparently
known about the severity of the
problems for “several months,” to
this Court the federal government
has downplayed the burden imposed
by those reporting requirements, and
has argued that those requirements
do no harm to large employers like
the State. Now, however, they have
publically acknowledged that the
requirements are so “complex” that
large employers need a full year to
figure out how to comply. The delay
is at least an implicit admission by
the federal government that the

92

